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INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, New York resident Saliha Madden opened a credit 
card account with Bank of America.1 Under New York state 
usury law, a lender is allowed to charge up to 25 percent inter-
est. However, because Bank of America is a national bank, it was 
able to charge Madden 27 percent interest. Three years later, 
after having amassed over $5,000 of debt, Madden stopped mak-
ing payments to the bank, and the bank sold Madden’s debt to 
Midland Funding, LLC, a debt collector. Midland attempted to 
collect the 27 percent interest to which Madden originally 
agreed, but Madden protested and filed suit, claiming that, be-
cause Midland was not a national bank, the 27 percent interest 
rate was usurious under New York state law. 
The National Bank Act of 18642 (NBA or “the Act”) allows na-
tional banks to charge an interest rate higher than the state’s cap 
on interest under certain circumstances.3 Despite the fact that the 
Act was passed in 1864, questions about its effect remain unans-
wered. Notably, the question whether interest rates on national 
bank–originated debt become usurious when transferred remains 
unresolved. Historically, Supreme Court opinions have generally 
favored national banks, as the Court has deemed them “[n]ational 
favorites.”4 However, a recent decision in the Second Circuit calls 
 
 † BS 2011, New York University; JD Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago 
Law School. 
 1 These facts are largely drawn from Madden v Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F3d 
246, 247–48 (2d Cir 2015). 
 2 13 Stat 99, codified as amended at 12 USC § 21 et seq. While the Act was not 
originally named the National Bank Act, Congress has since formally adopted the name. 
See 12 USC § 38. 
 3 See 12 USC § 85 (applying the usury law only of the state “where the bank is lo-
cated” to a national bank regardless of where the national bank conducts business). 
 4 Tiffany v National Bank of Missouri, 85 US (18 Wall) 409, 413 (1874). 
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into question whether deference continues after a national bank 
has sold its interest in the original loan.5 
This question is important because it affects the interest 
rates that consumers will be charged on their loans and could af-
fect how national banks manage their balance sheets.6 A re-
striction on the ability to sell loans may decrease the amount of 
credit available to consumers, as banks will be forced to retain 
more risk on their balance sheets.7 Yet some contest the impact 
this may have on lenders, and the general enforcement of usury 
laws may in fact relieve consumers from heavy interest burdens.8 
This Comment explores the issue; it concludes that a national 
bank should be allowed to sell its loans, and that the new owner 
should be allowed to continue to collect interest that would be 
usurious if the new owner had originated the loan. 
Applying transaction cost economics, this Comment ulti-
mately argues that a court’s decision on preemptive effect will not 
dissuade banks from selling these loans and allowing third-party 
purchasers to collect at the original interest rate. Of course, pre-
venting a third party from inheriting the preemptive effect of the 
NBA will make selling loans more costly (that is, it will increase 
transaction costs) for the bank, but consumers will ultimately 
have to bear these costs in the form of either higher interest rates 
or reduced credit. As such, this Comment shows that allowing a 
third party to inherit preemption not only is supported by an ana-
lysis of existing preemption law and the common law but also ben-
efits consumers. 
To show that the preemptive force of the NBA should con-
tinue upon the sale of a loan to a third party by a national bank, 
this Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the history 
 
 5 See generally Madden, 786 F3d 246. See also Part II.B. 
 6 See Brief of the American Bankers Association, Independent Community Bankers 
of America, California Bankers Association, and Utah Bankers Association as Amici Cu-
riae in Support of the Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Madden v Midland 
Funding, LLC, Civil Action No 14-2131, *7–15 (2d Cir filed June 26, 2015) (available on 
Westlaw at 2015 WL 4153962) (arguing that not allowing a third party to inherit preemp-
tion upon a loan sale will cause a “serious disruption of the lending markets”). 
 7 For example, an inability to sell loans made for the purpose of securitizing them 
into a securitization vehicle may force the bank to hold on to more loans than it usually 
would. If the bank could sell the loans, it could use the cash generated from such sales to 
fund new loans; a restriction on the ability to do so may impair the bank’s ability to issue 
credit to consumers and corporations. 
 8 See Brief in Opposition, Midland Funding, LLC v Madden, Docket No 15-610, 
*16–23 (US filed Feb 12, 2016) (available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 552718). 
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of the NBA; the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on preemption gen-
erally, as well as with respect to the NBA; the history and purpose 
of state usury laws; and the growth in national banks and lending 
by national banks in the latter part of the twentieth century. 
Part II discusses the current preemption issue and the differences 
in interpretation between the Second Circuit and the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits. Finally, Part III provides three frameworks—
preemption analysis, application of the common law and consti-
tutional law, and a transaction cost framework—to support a con-
clusion that the preemptive effect of the NBA continues upon the 
sale of a loan to a third party. 
I.  PREEMPTION, USURY, AND THE NATIONAL BANK ACT 
The National Bank Act has emerged as a powerful tool pro-
tecting national banks from state regulation. Originally passed 
during the Civil War to provide a stable national currency and 
banking system, the Act provides national banks with a signifi-
cant shield against intrusion by state regulations and consumer 
protection laws. This Part proceeds by first considering the ori-
gins of the NBA, and second discussing the preemption of state 
laws, both in general and with respect to the NBA. Finally, this 
Part concludes with a brief discussion of the history and purpose 
of state usury laws, followed by an overview of the growth of the 
consumer protection movement. 
A. The National Bank Act 
Congress passed the NBA at the height of the Civil War in 
1864 to create a stable national currency and banking system dur-
ing and after the Civil War.9 According to one congressman, the 
Act was supposed to create a national banking system “so perfect” 
that the state banking system would evaporate, because “the sys-
tem of State banks [ ] ha[d] outlived its usefulness.”10 However, 
because the NBA was expected to significantly disrupt the state 
 
 9 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Activities and Operations; 
Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed Reg 46119, 46120 (2003) (describing the his-
tory of national banking laws, including the NBA). 
 10 Cong Globe, 38th Cong, 1st Sess 1256 (Mar 23, 1864) (statement of Rep Hooper). 
See also Watters v Wachovia Bank, NA, 550 US 1, 11 (2007) (claiming that the NBA was 
intended “[t]o prevent inconsistent or intrusive state regulation from impairing the na-
tional [banking] system”). 
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banking system, Congress worried that states would try to inter-
fere with national banks.11 As such, Congress created the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to exercise oversight, 
supervisory, and regulatory power over national banks.12 To be 
overseen by the OCC (that is, to become a national bank), a bank 
needs to file its charter with the OCC.13 
The OCC is responsible for supervising national banks, but it 
was also established to protect national banks from “hostile state 
interference.”14 Congress allocated substantially all responsibility 
for the national banking system to the OCC, as it believed that a 
national bank “must not be subjected to any local government, 
State or municipal; it must be kept absolutely and exclusively un-
der that Government from which it derives its functions.”15 In 
some instances, the NBA makes certain areas off-limits to the 
states. Specifically, the NBA applies only the usury law of the 
state “where the bank is located” to a national bank, regardless of 
where the national bank conducts business.16 
Given the regulatory advantages national banks had over 
state banks after the NBA’s passage, Congress expected the demise 
of the state banking system.17 Despite this expectation, most state 
banks did not convert to national banks immediately after the 
NBA’s passage.18 To encourage state banks to convert, Congress 
enacted a 10 percent tax on notes issued by state banks.19 Though 
the purpose of the tax was “scarcely concealed,”20 the Supreme 
Court upheld the tax, providing another example of Congress’s 
 
 11 See National Banks and the Dual Banking System *16–17 (Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, Sept 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/FB9U-3HDV. 
 12 See id at *17. 
 13 See 12 USC § 21. 
 14 68 Fed Reg at 46120–21 (cited in note 9). 
 15 Cong Globe, 38th Cong, 1st Sess 1893 (Apr 27, 1864) (statement of Sen Sumner). 
 16 12 USC § 85. A bank is located in the state designated in its organization certifi-
cate. See Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v First of Omaha Service Corp, 439 US 
299, 310 (1978) (observing that congressional delegates assumed during debate over the 
NBA that a national bank would be “‘located’ for purposes of [12 USC § 85] in the [s]tate 
named in its organization certificate”). The NBA requires persons forming a national bank 
to list “[t]he place where its operations of discount and deposit are to be carried on, desig-
nating the State, Territory, or District, and the particular county and city, town, or village” 
in the organization certificate. 12 USC § 22. 
 17 National Banks and the Dual Banking System at *16 (cited in note 11). 
 18 See id at *18 (noting that “state banks failed to convert in expected numbers”). 
 19 See Richard Scott Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey, and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Law of 
Banking and Financial Institutions 9 (Aspen 4th ed 2009) (“Congress provided the stick 
in 1865 by imposing a punitive and constitutionally suspect 10% tax on state bank notes.”). 
 20 Veazie Bank v Fenno, 75 US (8 Wall) 533, 556 (1869) (Nelson dissenting). 
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power regarding national banking.21 Going further, the Supreme 
Court has since said that national banks were “designed to be used 
to aid the government in the administration of an important 
branch of the public service. . . . [T]he States can exercise no control 
over them, nor in any wise affect their operation, except in so far 
as Congress may see proper to permit.”22 The Supreme Court, dat-
ing back to McCulloch v Maryland,23 has “held federal law supreme 
over state law with respect to national banking.”24 As a result, state 
laws are often considered preempted by the NBA.25 A proper un-
derstanding of this special standard, however, also requires con-
sidering the origins of national preemption laws. 
B. National Preemption of State Laws 
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution establishes that 
national laws supersede state laws, and federal preemption doc-
trine emanates from the Supremacy Clause.26 The Supremacy 
Clause resolves the foreseeable conflict that can occur when two 
governments (national and state) are permitted to legislate on an 
issue, and it “provides a clear rule that federal law ‘shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land.’”27 Courts have established the doc-
trine of preemption to implement the clear rule of the Supremacy 
Clause. Preemption claims are evaluated based on three theories 
of preemption: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict 
preemption. Express preemption is found when Congress has 
“withdraw[n] specified powers from the States by enacting a stat-
ute containing an express preemption provision.”28 Field preemp-
tion has generally been found when “Congress has legislated so 
comprehensively that federal law occupies an entire field of regu-
lation and leaves no room for state law.”29 Lastly, conflict preemp-
tion is found “when compliance with both state and federal law is 
 
 21 See id at 549. 
 22 Farmers’ and Mechanics’ National Bank v Dearing, 91 US 29, 33–34 (1875). 
 23 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
 24 Watters, 550 US at 10. 
 25 See id at 12 (“[W]hen state prescriptions significantly impair the exercise of au-
thority, enumerated or incidental under the NBA, the State’s regulations must give way.”). 
 26 See US Const Art VI, cl 2. 
 27 Arizona v United States, 132 S Ct 2492, 2500 (2012), quoting US Const Art VI, cl 2. 
 28 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2500–01. See also Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
v Whiting, 131 S Ct 1968, 1977 (2011) (“When a federal law contains an express preemp-
tion clause, we focus on the plain wording of the clause.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 29 Wachovia Bank, NA v Burke, 414 F3d 305, 313 (2d Cir 2005). 
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impossible, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”30 
Despite a robust preemption doctrine, the Court has gener-
ally adopted a presumption against preemption.31 To rebut this 
presumption, the Court looks to congressional intent, calling it 
“‘the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.”32 As dis-
cussed above, Congress’s intent in passing the NBA was to relieve 
future national banks from state interference.33 As a result, the 
presumption against preemption is generally inapplicable in NBA 
cases.34 
Shortly after the NBA’s passage, the Supreme Court began 
establishing preemption standards for the NBA. In Tiffany v Na-
tional Bank of Missouri,35 the Court addressed the question 
whether a national bank could charge a higher rate of interest 
than a state’s usury law permitted because it was located in an-
other state.36 The Court upheld § 30 of the NBA (now 12 USC 
§ 85), allowing a national bank to charge a higher rate of inter-
est.37 The Court additionally declared that national banks were 
“[n]ational favorites” and were expected to “tak[e] the place of 
[s]tate banks.”38 While express preemption was at work in Tiffany, 
courts most often apply conflict preemption doctrine when deter-
mining whether the NBA preempts applicable state laws.39 
 
 30 California v ARC America Corp, 490 US 93, 100–01 (1989) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 31 See Wyeth v Levine, 555 US 555, 565 (2009); Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA 
v Nelson, 517 US 25, 30 (1996) (“This question is basically one of congressional intent. Did 
Congress, in enacting the Federal Statute, intend to exercise its constitutionally delegated 
authority to set aside the laws of a State? If so, the Supremacy Clause requires courts to 
follow federal, not state, law.”). 
 32 Medtronic, Inc v Lohr, 518 US 470, 485 (1996), quoting Retail Clerks International 
Association, Local 1625, AFL–CIO v Schermerhorn, 375 US 96, 103 (1963). 
 33 See Part I.A. 
 34 See note 25 and accompanying text. 
 35 85 US (18 Wall) 409 (1874). 
 36 Id at 410–11. 
 37 Id at 413. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Watters, 550 US at 11, citing Davis v Elmira Savings Bank, 161 US 275, 290 
(1896) (“Federally chartered banks are subject to state laws of general application in their 
daily business to the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general pur-
poses of the NBA.”). 
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C. The NBA and Preemption of State Laws 
1. Marquette and the rise of national banks. 
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has generally held, in 
line with Tiffany, that the NBA preempts state law. However, re-
cent cases show that the preemption of state law is not a fait ac-
compli upon the invocation of the NBA. Marquette National Bank 
of Minneapolis v First of Omaha Service Corp40 sets the stage. In 
Marquette, the Court addressed whether 12 USC § 85 allowed a 
national bank organized in one state to charge interest at a rate 
acceptable in the state where it was located to out-of-state cus-
tomers.41 A unanimous Court declared that 12 USC § 85 “ha[d] 
been interpreted for over a century to give ‘advantages to Na-
tional banks over their State competitors.’”42 The Court deter-
mined that the interest rate on interstate loans was “governed by 
federal law” and that “a national bank may charge interest on any 
loan at the rate allowed by the laws of the State in which the bank 
is located.”43 Despite the lack of relevant legislative history, the 
Court concluded that Congress was aware of a well-functioning 
interbank loan-trading-and-endorsing system when it enacted 
the NBA.44 As a result, the Court did not find Congress’s silence 
to be dispositive; rather, the Court held that the NBA did not ex-
clude interstate loans.45 
The Court’s decision in Marquette allowed national banks to 
export one state’s usury laws into all other states. Additionally, 
 
 40 439 US 299 (1978). 
 41 Id at 301. 
 42 Id at 314, quoting Tiffany, 85 US (18 Wall) at 413. 
 43 Marquette, 439 US at 308 (quotation marks omitted). 
 44 Citing precedent, the Court in Marquette noted that “numerous judicial decisions 
in cases arising out of interstate loan transactions” support the proposition that Congress 
was aware of the market for interstate loans. Id at 317. The interbank loan-trading-and-
endorsing system allows banks to diversify their risk away from local populations and 
provides an additional supply of financing capital to areas where local banks cannot meet 
the needs of local borrowers. In defining the interbank loan-trading-and-endorsing system, 
the Court noted that “[m]oney is frequently borrowed in one state, by a corporation created 
in another. The numerous banks established by different states are in the constant habit 
of contracting and dealing with one another.” Id, quoting Bank of Augusta v Earle, 38 US 
(13 Pet) 519, 590 (1839). Additionally, the Court cited several scholarly works as historical 
evidence of the existence of an active interbank loan-trading-and-endorsing system when 
the NBA was passed. Marquette, 439 US at 317. For one of the scholarly works cited by 
the Court, see R.M. Breckenridge, Discount Rates in the United States, 13 Polit Sci Q 119, 
136–38 (1898) (discussing how banks augment local capital supplies by using an interbank 
system). 
 45 Marquette, 439 US at 318. 
10 SMITH_CMT_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016 2:24 PM 
1638  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1631 
   
the Court rejected the argument that a national bank was located 
in the state in which the loan was made. Such a decision could 
“throw into confusion the complex system of modern interstate 
banking,” and the Court relied on administrability concerns to re-
ject this argument.46 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with respect to the 
NBA, especially its decision in Marquette, led to a dramatic rise 
in the size and scale of national banks. Contrary to Congress’s 
expectations, nationally chartered banks did not initially over-
shadow their state-chartered peers.47 However, over time na-
tional banks have come to dominate the market, especially after 
Marquette. The ease of chartering a national bank,48 coupled with 
the general rule that the NBA preempts state consumer protec-
tion laws, led to significant growth in the amount of assets held 
by national banks during the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury.49 Due to consolidation and other factors, the proportion of 
assets held by nationally chartered banks increased from 56.3 
percent to 69.4 percent of all assets held by banks from 1997 to 
2009.50 Perhaps unsurprisingly, these banks have tended to be 
located in Delaware and South Dakota because of these states’ 
lax (indeed, almost nonexistent) usury laws.51 
2. Preemption doctrine after Marquette. 
Marquette sheds light on the Court’s preemption jurispru-
dence with respect to the NBA. Because congressional intent is 
the guiding light of preemption analysis, the Court’s focus on Con-
gress’s knowledge during the passage of the NBA was paramount 
 
 46 Id at 312–13. 
 47 See text accompanying notes 17–18. 
 48 See 12 USC § 21. Chartering a national bank is relatively straightforward. Though 
a de novo application for a national bank charter will require approval from the OCC (and 
potentially the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve), 
regulators will look only to the bank’s business plan, management experience, and finan-
cial resources. See Becoming a National Bank *1–3 (OCC, Feb 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6H8B-CBRM. While it takes planning and know-how to start a national 
bank, there is nothing about receiving a national bank charter that makes it prohibitively 
difficult compared to the state-chartering process. 
 49 See Gary W. Whalen, Why Do De Novo Banks Choose a National Charter? *1–2 (OCC 
Economics Working Paper No 2010-2, May 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/K2F7-ZSJX 
(showing that from 1998 to 2008 the percentage of assets held by national banks increased). 
 50 Id at *1 n 2. 
 51 See Robin Stein, The Ascendancy of the Credit Card Industry (Frontline, Nov 23, 
2004), archived at http://perma.cc/C256-EV6C. Both Delaware and South Dakota effec-
tively have no usury laws. See note 259. 
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to its determination that the ambiguity within the statute should 
be resolved in favor of national banks. 
The Court provided more-fulsome guidance on NBA preemp-
tion analysis in Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA v Nelson,52 in 
which the Court held that the NBA preempted a Florida law res-
tricting national banks from selling insurance.53 Florida had 
passed a law that restricted national banks’ ability to sell insur-
ance in Florida despite the fact that federal law permitted na-
tional banks to sell insurance.54 The Court concluded that neither 
explicit nor field preemption was applicable, and it therefore em-
ployed conflict preemption.55 Because federal law did not mandate 
that national banks sell insurance but only authorized them to do 
so, Florida’s restrictions did not expressly conflict with the NBA. 
However, the state law conflicted with the purpose of the statute 
unless the “federal purpose [was] to grant the bank only . . . per-
mission to sell insurance to the extent that state law also 
grant[ed] permission to do so.”56 
The Court sidestepped this argument, finding that, by giving 
a national bank permission to sell insurance, Congress was giving 
national banks an additional power.57 The provision of an addi-
tional power by Congress is important because the Court has tra-
ditionally interpreted a grant of power to national banks as 
preempting contrary state law.58 When Congress grants a power 
to a national bank, the Court assumes that Congress does not 
want state laws to impair either the functioning of national banks 
or the exercise of their powers.59 Noting that this presumption of 
preemption may limit a state’s ability to regulate a national bank, 
the Court stated that state laws are not preempted to the extent 
that state laws “do[ ] not prevent or significantly interfere with 
the national bank’s exercise of its powers.”60 
 
 52 517 US 25 (1996). 
 53 Id at 28. 
 54 Id at 28–29. 
 55 Id at 31. 
 56 Barnett Bank, 517 US at 31 (emphasis omitted). 
 57 See id at 32. 
 58 Id (noting that the “history [of bank legislation] is one of interpreting grants of 
both enumerated and incidental ‘powers’ to national banks as grants of authority not nor-
mally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law”). 
 59 Id at 33–34. 
 60 Barnett Bank, 517 US at 33 (emphasis added). See also National Bank v Common-
wealth, 76 US (9 Wall) 353, 362 (1869) (“[A]gencies of the Federal government [like national 
banks] are only exempted from State legislation, so far as that legislation may interfere with, 
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Barnett Bank lays out the standard preemption analysis that 
the Court typically performs when presented with a conflict be-
tween state law and the NBA. To determine if the NBA preempts 
state law, the Court will first ask if the state and federal statutes 
are “in irreconcilable conflict” with one another.61 The most obvi-
ous form of irreconcilable conflict involves not just grants of power 
but affirmative mandates requiring the exercise of the granted 
power. For example, in Barnett Bank, this type of conflict would 
have existed if the NBA had mandated national banks to sell in-
surance while state law simultaneously forbade them from doing 
so. Even if this form of irreconcilable conflict is not found, the 
Court presumes “that normally Congress would not want States 
to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that 
Congress explicitly granted.”62 In Barnett Bank, the answer to 
this question was relatively simple: a state law prohibition of a 
national bank’s power significantly impairs the bank’s ability to 
exercise that power. Since the Court found that allowing national 
banks to sell insurance gave them the power to do so, the state 
law prohibition significantly impaired national banks’ ability to 
exercise their power.63 However, in other cases, the question 
whether a state regulation would significantly impair the power 
of a national bank turns on an intensely fact-based inquiry. 
While national banks were protected from state interference 
after Barnett Bank, an open question remained: Do national bank 
subsidiaries receive the same protection? The Supreme Court an-
swered affirmatively in Watters v Wachovia Bank, NA.64 The 
Court focused not on legal entity structure but on the powers of 
the national bank, similar to the Court’s focus in Barnett Bank. 
Wachovia acquired a mortgage lender in Michigan that had been 
subject to Michigan’s financial regulation.65 Upon acquisition, 
Wachovia informed Michigan’s financial regulator that it would 
no longer be submitting to state supervisory control because the 
subsidiary was now entitled to preemption against state regula-
tory authority.66 In determining that Michigan could no longer 
regulate the subsidiary, the Court reiterated that “federal control 
 
or impair their efficiency in performing the functions by which they are designed to serve 
that government.”). 
 61 Barnett Bank, 517 US at 31 (quotation marks omitted). 
 62 Id at 33. 
 63 See id at 34–35. 
 64 550 US 1 (2007). 
 65 Id at 8. 
 66 Id at 8–9. 
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shields national banking from unduly burdensome and duplica-
tive state regulation.”67 The Court concluded that national banks 
and their subsidiaries are allowed to “engage[ ] in the business of 
banking.”68 As such, the subsidiary had the power to engage in 
mortgage lending, as ongoing regulation at the state level would 
“hamper[ ] the federally permitted activities of a national bank.”69 
The Court’s focus in the preemption analysis was “on the exercise 
of a national bank’s powers, not on its corporate structure.”70 Put 
another way, when a subsidiary is using a power Congress 
granted to national banks, preemption analysis continues as if 
the national bank itself were engaging in the activity. The same 
is not true of other powers. Thus, a national bank subsidiary that 
is engaged in selling computers would be subject to state regula-
tion, because the sale of merchandise is not a power of national 
banks.71 
The Court’s highly deferential posture when it comes to na-
tional banks stems from both Congress’s intent in passing the 
NBA and the idea that certain acts of Congress bestow powers on 
national banks that grant banks the presumption of preemption 
unless state laws do not significantly interfere with those powers. 
The Court’s deferential posture is not, however, without limits. In 
Cuomo v Clearing House Association, LLC,72 the Court deter-
mined that the OCC’s regulations had gone too far. Regulations 
issued by the OCC established that it was the only entity that 
could exercise visitorial powers73 over a national bank, even in 
cases of “[e]nforcing compliance with any applicable federal or 
state laws.”74 Applying Chevron deference,75 the Court determined 
 
 67 Id at 11. 
 68 Watters, 550 US at 21 (quotation marks omitted). See also 12 USC § 371(a) (allow-
ing a national bank to issue mortgages). The general powers of national banks are spelled 
out in 12 USC § 24, and 12 USC § 24a provides authorization for a national bank’s subsid-
iaries to engage in banking activities. 
 69 Watters, 550 US at 18, 21. 
 70 Id at 18 (emphasis omitted). 
 71 See id at 21 (“The NBA is thus properly read by OCC to protect from state hin-
drance a national bank’s engagement in the ‘business of banking’ whether conducted by 
the bank itself or by an operating subsidiary, empowered to do only what the bank itself 
could do.”) (emphasis added). 
 72 557 US 519 (2009). 
 73 “Visitorial powers” generally “refers to a sovereign’s supervisory powers over cor-
porations,” including “any form of administrative oversight that allows a sovereign to in-
spect books and records on demand.” Id at 535. 
 74 Id at 524–25, quoting 12 CFR § 7.4000. 
 75 See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 
US 837 (1984). 
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that the OCC’s interpretation of the term “visitorial powers” was 
not reasonable given the historical context of the term.76 
Despite Clearing House Association, the Court’s jurispru-
dence on NBA preemption is still highly deferential and suspi-
cious of state interference with the powers of national banks. That 
stance remains unchanged by the financial crisis and the passage 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act.77 Dodd-Frank did, however, amend the NBA by codifying a 
preemption standard in 12 USC § 25b.78 12 USC § 25b adopts the 
“significantly interferes” language of Barnett Bank after specifi-
cally citing that case as the applicable preemption standard.79 
Further, the OCC may make preemption determinations on a 
case-by-case basis, but those determinations will still be subject 
to the Barnett Bank standard and traditional Chevron deference 
to the OCC’s interpretation of the NBA’s language.80 The codifica-
tion of the Barnett Bank standard by Congress suggests that the 
associated powers were granted to national banks and that the 
OCC’s interpretation of those powers will continue to have signif-
icant force in preempting state laws. 
The suspicion of state interference underlying the NBA did 
not extend to state usury laws. While the NBA restricted states 
from interfering with national banks, the states remained the 
source of interest rate limits.81 Therefore, the preemption of state 
usury laws can be fully understood only in the context of the his-
tory and purpose of usury laws. 
D. The History and Purpose of Usury Laws 
Usury laws have existed for most of recorded history.82 While 
usury laws emerged as a result of moral disapprobation of lending 
in general and lending at excessive interest rates in particular,83 
 
 76 See Clearing House Association, 557 US at 525–31. 
 77 Pub L 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010), codified at 12 USC § 5301 et seq. 
 78 124 Stat at 2014–17. 
 79 12 USC § 25b(b)(1) (stating that “[s]tate consumer finance laws are preempted” “in 
accordance with the legal standard . . . in Barnett Bank of Marion County”). 
 80 See 12 USC § 25b(b). 
 81 See 12 USC § 85. 
 82 See Amanda Katherine Sadie Hill, Note, State Usury Laws: Are They Effective in 
a Post-GLBA World?, 6 NC Bank Inst 411, 421 (2002) (“As examples from Aristotle to the 
Bible illustrate, usury laws have been enacted throughout most of recorded history.”) (quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 83 See James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 
Ariz St L J 61, 63–65 (describing how early civilizations adopted usury laws primarily due 
to moral rather than economic considerations). 
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they persist today to protect consumers. Without usury laws, con-
sumer advocates believe consumers would be unprotected from 
disingenuous lenders.84 Advocates claim the average consumer 
does not have enough knowledge to fully understand the implica-
tions of most loans, especially the most pernicious lending prac-
tices such as payday lending and instant tax refunds.85 Further, 
advocates argue that extremely high interest rates can lead to a 
cycle of borrowing that unsophisticated consumers cannot under-
stand when they initially take out a loan and cannot escape once 
they do.86 To protect these consumers, states limit the amount of 
interest lenders can charge via usury laws. 
While these consumer protection arguments reflect what 
courts and academics typically acknowledge as the purpose of 
usury laws, some commentators have suggested that usury laws 
may also constrain or deter potentially risky behavior that results 
from the creation and continuation of the welfare state.87 Addit-
ionally, behavioral economics research continues to find that con-
sumers may have time-inconsistent discount rates. That is, con-
sumers value benefits received over time (such as dividends or 
annuity payments) in a way that is inconsistent, such that in-
creases in value across the same period of time will be thought of 
differently depending on how much time has already passed. Such 
inconsistency is not the expected result under the traditional ra-
tional expectations approach to discounting.88 The presence of 
 
 84 See Hill, Note, 6 NC Bank Inst at 422 (cited in note 82) (“The hope is that consum-
ers who are not financially well informed will not fall victim to unfair lending practices.”). 
 85 See id at 421–22 (claiming that consumers misunderstand or undercomprehend 
information about these loans, such that they appear to consumers to be cheaper than they 
truly are). 
 86 See Robert Mayer, Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps, and Deregulation, 69 Wash 
& Lee L Rev 807, 837–39 (2012) (showing that high interest rates lead to longer duration 
loans, constituting a “debt trap[ ]”). 
 87 See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Uncon-
scionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 
24 J Legal Stud 283, 285 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he provision of welfare . . . produces per-
verse incentives to take credit risks . . . [and] restrictive contract doctrines are appropriate 
means for deterring this socially costly behavior”). 
 88 For example, when offered a choice between $50 today and $100 one year from 
now, most people will choose $50 today. However, when offered the choice between $50 in 
five years and $100 in six years, most people will choose $100 in six years. The difference 
in value between both options should be the same from a temporal perspective—there is a 
one-year delay in either case—so people’s choices reflect time-inconsistent discounting. 
See Leonard Green, Astrid F. Fry, and Joel Myerson, Discounting of Delayed Rewards: A 
Life-Span Comparison, 5 Psychological Sci 33, 33–34 (1994). See also generally Shane 
Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Prefer-
ence: A Critical Review, 40 J Econ Lit 351 (2002). 
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time-inconsistent discount rates may favor a paternalistic re-
sponse in the form of usury laws. 
Like any price cap, usury laws may also have deleterious ra-
tioning effects. For instance, potential borrowers whose risks war-
rant interest rates higher than the maximum rate set by usury 
laws may not be able to borrow money. Economic intuition makes 
clear that price restrictions reduce the quantity of goods sup-
plied,89 and empirical evidence supports this on a microeconomic 
level: if the rate of allowable interest increases, more loans will 
be made.90 While this critique is attractive, it does not address the 
normative issue: Should governments enforce an artificial limit 
on interest rates to protect consumers? The classic libertarian re-
sponse assumes that freedom of contract is supreme,91 and some 
commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the enforcement 
of closely related doctrines like unconscionability (and perhaps 
their very existence) harms consumers by “encourag[ing] irre-
sponsibility and hence greater dependency” on the laws.92 
Regardless of the market limitations and potential normative 
arguments against usury laws, they continue to exist, in some 
form, in all fifty states.93 While the NBA could have suspended all 
usury laws, Congress instead chose to adopt the state usury laws 
for its own purposes within the NBA.94 Of course, Congress did 
intend for the NBA to create uniformity,95 which cuts against the 
idea that Congress did not intend for the NBA to preempt state 
usury laws. Perhaps more persuasively, when Congress allowed 
banks to have interstate branches,96 Congress adopted a usury 
savings clause that, in no uncertain terms, reiterated that 12 USC 
 
 89 See, for example, William J. Baumol and Alan S. Blinder, Microeconomics: Princi-
ples and Policy 375–76 (Cengage Learning 13th ed 2015). 
 90 See Oren Rigbi, The Effects of Usury Laws: Evidence from the Online Loan Market, 
95 Rev Econ & Stat 1238, 1239–47 (2013) (showing that “[b]orrowers who were restricted 
under their original [usury] cap benefited from the increase in the cap, and the marginal 
borrower benefited most”). 
 91 See Jeremy Bentham, Defence of Usury: Shewing the Impolicy of the Present Legal 
Restraints on the Terms of Pecuniary Bargains 2 (printed for T. Payne 2d ed 1790). 
 92 Horacio Spector, A Contractarian Approach to Unconscionability, 81 Chi Kent L 
Rev 95, 116 (2006).  
 93 Even Delaware and South Dakota, the states where most national banks are lo-
cated, have usury laws, albeit weak ones. See note 259. 
 94 See 12 USC § 85. 
 95 See notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 96 See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub L 
No 103-328, 108 Stat 2338. 
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§ 85 would continue to have preemptive effect.97 However, courts 
remain split as to which usury law Congress intended to apply 
when a national bank–originated loan is transferred. 
E. The Rise of the Consumer Protection Movement 
The growing preeminence of national banks, coupled with 
their ability to avoid most state law consumer protection regula-
tion because of preemption, has spurred increasingly vocal advo-
cacy for consumer protection in the context of financial products. 
These advocates point to a growing body of empirical literature to 
illustrate the harms associated with an underregulated financial 
industry. This Comment straddles the border of this ongoing de-
bate between advocates and critics—a debate that has not focused 
on usury, despite usury’s relationship to consumer finance, 
largely because the decision in Marquette allows national banks 
to import the lax usury laws of Delaware and South Dakota to the 
rest of the country. 
A growing body of literature suggests that the growth of na-
tional banks has led to a growth in the availability of financing, 
which has caused consumer distress. These critiques focus on the 
growth of fees and short-term credit products with interest rates 
above 100 percent.98 While the criticisms of the banking system 
are varied, one argument is that preemption allows national 
banks to skirt state consumer protection laws. To consumer finan-
cial protection advocates, the prevalence of preemption within 
banking law has resulted in a situation in which “almost any state 
statute designed to protect consumers is preempted by federal 
law.”99 This critique does not rely on the assumption that state 
 
 97 Specifically, Congress reiterated its stance on the preemptive force of 12 USC § 85 
when it passed the Riegle-Neal Act and allowed for interstate branches. In a portion of the 
Act codified in a note accompanying 12 USC § 1811, Congress stated that “[n]o provision 
of this title and no amendment made by this title to any other provision of law shall be 
construed as affecting in any way . . . the applicability of [12 USC § 85].” Riegle-Neal Act 
§ 111, 108 Stat at 2365. 
 98 See Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U Pa L Rev 1, 
44–46 (2008); Ronald J. Mann and Jim Hawkins, Just until Payday, 54 UCLA L Rev 855, 
857–61, 871–72 (2007) (describing short-term credit products with annual interest rates 
over 400 percent and suggesting that 12 USC § 85 may have been one of the contributing 
factors allowing these products to flourish); Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 Yale J 
Reg 121, 154–62 (2004) (describing the difficulties consumers face if they lack access to 
traditional banking products). 
 99 Bar-Gill and Warren, 157 U Pa L Rev at 83 (cited in note 98), citing Mark Furletti, 
Comment, The Debate over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of State Efforts to 
Regulate Credit Cards, 77 Temple L Rev 425, 426 (2004). 
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regulation is inherently good—advocates admit that “[i]n an era 
of interstate banking, uniform regulation of consumer credit prod-
ucts at the federal level may well be more efficient than a litany 
of consumer protection rules that vary from state to state.”100 Ra-
ther, these advocates cite the failure of federal regulatory agen-
cies to provide adequate protection to consumers.101 
Critics of the consumer protection movement reply to these 
concerns from many angles. Some posit that consumer financial 
“injuries” are not, in fact, injuries—injuries result in deadweight 
losses while, in consumer financial products, the harm to the con-
sumer is a gain to the creditor, meaning that there is no 
deadweight loss.102 In areas such as tort law, in which harms pro-
duce deadweight losses, ex ante regulation is appropriate—but 
consumer financial products do not have the same attributes.103 
Ex ante regulation will not result in increased efficient precau-
tions but rather in reduced supply of the product, which may im-
pact the most vulnerable consumers.104 Additionally, other critics 
respond to the preemption point by showing that curtailing 
preemption would reduce the availability of credit and, thus, 
would be inefficient.105 This debate persists even after the creation 
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an indep-
endent agency created by Dodd-Frank that has been supported by 
advocates of consumer financial protection since before its incep-
tion.106 The legal question—whether preemption of state usury 
laws continues upon the sale of a loan to a non–national bank 
third party—implicates this debate in some sense, but courts, ra-
ther than Congress, will be the arena in which it is answered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 Bar-Gill and Warren, 157 U Pa L Rev at 83 (cited in note 98). 
 101 See id at 70–77 (highlighting the failures of the current national regulatory system). 
 102 See Robert M. Lawless, The Limits of Contract as Product, 157 U Pa L Rev 
PENNumbra 160, 163–64 (2009). 
 103 See id. 
 104 See id. 
 105 See Joseph R. Mason, Robert Kulick, and Hal J. Singer, The Economic Impact of 
Eliminating Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 12 U Pa J Bus L 781, 792–
800 (2010). 
 106 See Bar-Gill and Warren, 157 U Pa L Rev at 98–100 (cited in note 98) (proposing 
the creation of “a single federal regulator . . . that w[ould] be put in charge of consumer 
credit products”). 
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II.  THE LAW OF THIRD-PARTY TRANSFERS OF NONUSURIOUS 
LOANS 
When making and processing loans, national banks are effec-
tively immune from state laws via preemption.107 However, when 
a national bank sells a loan, it remains an open question whether 
the NBA’s preemptive effect continues. Effectively, given the 
preemptive force of 12 USC § 85, a Delaware-based national bank 
can make a loan to a New York resident at a rate of interest that 
would be usurious under New York law but not usurious under 
Delaware law. However, if the national bank sells the loan, can 
the third-party non–national bank buyer collect at an interest 
rate that is usurious under New York law—that is, does the 
preemptive power of the NBA continue upon the sale of the loan 
to a third party? 
The Supreme Court has never decided this issue, but several 
circuits have reached diverging opinions. Specifically, the Fifth 
and Eighth Circuits have held that a nonusurious loan cannot be 
made usurious upon sale, while the Second Circuit has concluded 
that once a national bank is no longer affiliated with the loan, the 
loan may be made usurious.108 This Part examines the decisions 
of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and shows that they lend support 
for continuing preemption after a loan transfer by adoption of the 
“once nonusurious, always nonusurious” doctrine. The Seventh 
Circuit, in a case unrelated to NBA preemption, also adopted the 
once nonusurious, always nonusurious policy, and the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis is discussed and applied to the preemption issue 
in this Part. Next, this Part discusses the Second Circuit’s opin-
ions on NBA preemption, culminating in Madden v Midland 
Funding, LLC,109 in which the court held that preemption does not 
carry forward posttransfer.110 Finally, it compares the different 
analyses conducted by the Fifth, Eighth, and Second Circuits and 
puts to rest any possibility for distinguishing the cases on the 
facts. 
A. Initial Holdings Support Preemption Continuing Postsale 
Neither the Fifth nor the Eighth Circuit has explicitly ruled 
on the question of NBA preemption in the context of third-party 
 
 107 See Part I.C. 
 108 See Parts II.A–B. 
 109 786 F3d 246 (2d Cir 2015). 
 110 Id at 250. 
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transfers. However, cases within these circuits suggest that they 
hold the view that, once a nonusurious loan has been originated, 
the loan remains nonusurious for the remainder of its life, regard-
less of whether the loan is transferred. The Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed a related transfer issue in Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corp v Lattimore Land Corp.111 Lattimore had taken out a note 
from the Hamilton Mortgage Corporation.112 Hamilton Mortgage 
Corporation was a Georgia-based financial company (not a na-
tional bank), which charged Lattimore an interest rate that was 
allowable under Georgia law.113 Hamilton fell into distress and 
transferred over 90 percent of the interest in the loan to a related 
entity—the Hamilton National Bank, a Tennessee-based national 
bank.114 The FDIC eventually put Hamilton National Bank into 
receivership and attempted to collect on the debt Lattimore owed 
Hamilton National Bank.115 
Lattimore claimed Hamilton National Bank could not collect 
on the loan because the loan was usurious under Tennessee law, 
which Lattimore alleged applied to Hamilton National Bank per 
the NBA.116 The court found that the NBA did not apply and that 
normal choice-of-law rules suggested that the law of the state 
where the loan originated would control whether usury was an 
applicable defense to nonpayment of the loan.117 Summarizing its 
holding, the court stated that “the note, initially non-usurious, re-
mains so.”118 
The Eighth Circuit furthered this logic in Krispin v The 
May Department Stores Co.119 May Department Stores created 
an Arizona-based national bank to operate its credit card divi-
sion. The national bank would assign the receivables from the 
origination of credit to May Department Stores. Cardholders 
brought suit against May Department Stores alleging a usurious 
interest rate because the rate charged was above the rate allowed 
 
 111 656 F2d 139 (5th Cir 1981). 
 112 Id at 140. 
 113 See id at 146–47, 148 n 16. 
 114 Id at 146. 
 115 Lattimore, 656 F2d at 141. 
 116 Id at 146. 
 117 Id at 148–50. See also id at 149 n 18 (declining to reach but expressing skepticism 
about the defendants’ argument that “under 12 USC § 85, the Hamilton National Bank 
being located in Tennessee may only have held notes bearing 10% interest” because this 
argument “cut[ ] against the rule of validation generally applicable to allegedly usurious 
contracts with a substantial relation with more than one state”). 
 118 Id at 148. 
 119 218 F3d 919 (8th Cir 2000). 
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in Missouri, where May Department Stores was located.120 May 
Department Stores asserted a preemption defense because the 
originator of the credit was the national bank, not May Depart-
ment Stores.121 The interest rate charged was not usurious under 
Arizona law and, as such, May Department Stores believed the 
claim failed. 
Focusing on Lattimore as persuasive precedent, the Eighth 
Circuit looked to the originator of the debt to determine if the loan 
was usurious.122 Because a national bank originated the loan, the 
Eighth Circuit held that the NBA applied and preempted Missouri 
state law usury claims.123 Even though May Department Stores 
purchased the loans from the national bank, the court determined 
that it was more appropriate to look to the originating entity than 
to the assignee.124 The bank’s origination of the loans and ongoing 
involvement in the servicing of the loans was determinative of the 
issue such that the court did not conduct a thorough conflict 
preemption analysis; instead, it asserted that complete preemp-
tion allowed the national bank to avoid the state law usury 
claims.125 However, the court did not rule on the other purely state 
law claims brought by the plaintiffs, including “breach of contract, 
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, 
unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.”126 Thus, while the NBA 
may preempt usury claims, state law claims unpreempted by the 
NBA survive, and a national bank is likely subject to these types 
of claims.127 
Thus far, only the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have analyzed 
preemption in the context of third-party sales of loans, but the 
 
 120 See id at 921–22. 
 121 Id at 922–23. 
 122 See id at 924, citing Lattimore, 656 F3d at 147–49. 
 123 Krispin, 218 F3d at 924. 
 124 Id: 
[T]he store’s purchase of the bank’s receivables does not diminish the fact that 
it is now the bank, and not the store, that issues credit, processes and services 
customer accounts, and sets such terms as interest and late fees. Thus, although 
we recognize that the NBA governs only national banks, in these circumstances 
we agree with the district court that it makes sense to look to the originating 
entity (the bank), and not the ongoing assignee (the store), in determining 
whether the NBA applies. 
(citation omitted). 
 125 See id at 922–24. 
 126 Id at 925. 
 127 See 12 CFR § 7.4008(e) (stating that state laws on the subject of contracts and torts, 
among other subjects, “are not inconsistent with the . . . lending powers of national banks 
and apply to national banks to the extent consistent with” NBA preemption doctrine). 
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Seventh Circuit has more generally adopted the once nonusuri-
ous, always nonusurious standard.128 In assessing whether a non-
usurious loan becomes usurious upon sale to an unregulated en-
tity (which could not charge the same higher interest rate that 
the regulated entity could charge), Judge Richard Posner asked, 
“Why should the interest rate be lower if instead of collecting the 
debt directly the credit card company assigns (sells) the debt to 
another company, which hires the lawyer to collect it?”129 Posner 
found no reason for this distinction; in fact, he asserted that spe-
cialization in the market (credit card companies specializing in 
originating loans and debt collectors specializing in collecting on 
delinquent debt) likely reduces the cost of credit for borrowers.130 
If, on the other hand, the loan becomes usurious upon the transfer 
to a debt collector, the originator itself will have to collect the debt 
and will pass on the higher cost to the borrower.131 Posner’s argu-
ment did not rest solely on an economic analysis of the law; he 
went on to support his holding by asserting that “once assignors 
were authorized to charge interest, the common law kicked in and 
gave the assignees the same right, because the common law puts 
the assignee in the assignor’s shoes, whatever the shoe size.”132 
Lastly, and perhaps unpersuasively, Posner argued that the 
debtor should not receive the benefit of a lower interest rate upon 
default as that would create an incentive to default.133 
B. The Second Circuit Departs from Other Circuits: The NBA 
Is Inapplicable If a National Bank No Longer Owns the 
Loan 
Against the administrative ease and economic rationale of 
the once nonusurious, always nonusurious doctrine, the Second 
Circuit determined in Madden that once a national bank is no 
longer affiliated with the loan, preemption by the NBA ends and 
state usury laws apply.134 Before presenting the Second Circuit’s 
 
 128 See Olvera v Blitt & Gaines, PC, 431 F3d 285, 289 (7th Cir 2005) (holding that 
once a lender has made a nonusurious loan, a subsequent owner is permitted to charge 
the original interest rate at common law). 
 129 Id at 287. 
 130 See id at 288. 
 131 See id. 
 132 Olvera, 431 F3d at 289. 
 133 See id. While, on the margin, this assertion is likely correct, the debtor still main-
tains a significant incentive not to default, as default would force the debtor to incur higher 
interest rates in the future and may lead the debtor to enter costly bankruptcy proceedings. 
 134 See Madden, 786 F3d at 250. 
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rationale in Madden, this Comment explores that court’s prior 
NBA preemption jurisprudence. 
1. The Second Circuit distinguishes between agency and 
nonagency relationships for the purpose of NBA 
preemption. 
The Second Circuit has found that the NBA preempts state 
law when the state law fully forecloses the bank’s opportunity to 
exercise its power. This standard was developed in several Second 
Circuit cases that attempted to implement the “significantly im-
pairs” preemption standard adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Barnett Bank. In SPGGC, LLC v Blumenthal,135 the court addressed 
whether the sale of prepaid gift cards violated a Connecticut statute 
that banned gift card inactivity fees and expiration dates.136 
SPGGC, an owner and operator of shopping malls, sold prepaid 
gift cards issued by a national bank.137 Because the cards were 
sold by SPGGC, a non–national bank, but were issued via a na-
tional bank, the court first had to determine how to treat the re-
lationship between SPGGC and the national bank.138 
NBA preemption analysis focuses on the power being wielded 
by the subsidiary and not the corporate structure of the entity.139 
However, because SPGGC was a separate entity and not a sub-
sidiary, the court determined that preemption would generally 
not apply, though it acknowledged that “[i]t is possible that, in 
certain instances, a national bank’s decision to carry out its busi-
ness through an unaffiliated third party . . . might constitute an 
exercise of the bank’s incidental powers under the NBA.”140 Be-
cause the court did not consider this relationship with a third 
party an exercise of a national bank’s power, the court was left to 
“ask whether the regulation at issue actually affect[ed] the na-
tional bank’s exercise of any authorized powers or whether it 
limit[ed] only activities of the third party which [were] otherwise 
subject to state control.”141 
 
 135 505 F3d 183 (2d Cir 2007). 
 136 Id at 186–87. 
 137 Id at 186. 
 138 See id at 189–90. 
 139 See Part I.C.2. See also Watters, 550 US at 17 n 10 (“[F]or accounting and regula-
tory reporting purposes, an operating subsidiary is treated as part of the member bank; 
assets and liabilities of the two entities are combined.”). 
 140 SPGGC, 505 F3d at 190. 
 141 Id at 191.  
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The structure of the national bank’s relationship with 
SPGGC was such that the bank made money via interchange fees 
(fees charged to a retailer when the card is used), whereas SPGGC 
made money on the fees associated with the card (including the 
monthly service fee).142 Given this structure, prohibiting SPGGC 
from charging these fees should not have conflicted with the na-
tional bank’s power “to engage in [ ] offering ‘electronic stored 
value systems.’”143 The court noted the possibility that it might 
have come to a different conclusion, in line with the First Circuit’s 
conclusion in a similar case, if the national bank had issued the 
gift cards itself.144 
On the issue of the cards’ annual expiration, the court re-
manded because the national bank’s relationship with Visa, the 
card processor, mandated the yearly expiration of the card as part 
of Visa’s fraud-prevention program.145 The court concluded that 
“an outright prohibition on expiration dates could have prevented 
a [national bank] from acting as the issuer of the [ ] Giftcard.”146 
The court’s analysis of the relationship was highly focused on how 
the economic relationship would impact the bank’s ability to ex-
ercise its powers. Reducing or prohibiting SPGGC from collecting 
monthly fees would not directly impact the national bank; while 
SPGGC might respond by getting out of the business of issuing 
cards, the restriction would not directly prevent the bank from 
helping SPGGC issue those cards. In contrast, the prohibition 
against expiration dates would force the national bank out of the 
market because of its arrangement with Visa.147 
Similarly, the Second Circuit focused on the relationship be-
tween a national bank and a third party in Pacific Capital Bank, 
NA v Connecticut.148 That case involved a challenge to a Connect-
icut law that limited the rate of interest an entity could charge on 
 
 142 See id at 187. 
 143 Id at 189–90, quoting 12 CFR § 7.5002(a)(3). 
 144 See SPGGC, 505 F3d at 191, citing SPGGC, LLC v Ayotte, 488 F3d 525, 533 (1st 
Cir 2007) (holding that the NBA preempted a similar New Hampshire law when a national 
bank issued and set the terms of the gift cards). 
 145 SPGGC, 505 F3d at 187, 192 (noting that “to comply with Visa regulations, all [ ] 
Giftcards carried a one-year expiration date”). 
 146 Id at 191. 
 147 See id at 191–92. 
 148 542 F3d 341 (2d Cir 2008). 
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a refund-anticipation loan.149 The loan was originated by a na-
tional bank through a tax preparation service.150 The national 
bank alleged that the NBA preempted the Connecticut regula-
tion, and the court agreed.151 While the state argued that the law 
applied only to agents of the national bank, the court determined 
that the NBA allows national banks to exercise incidental powers 
through the use of agents.152 “A state statute that forbade national 
banks to exercise their incidental powers through agents would 
thus plainly be preempted. . . . [I]t [is] equally plain that a state 
statute cannot be allowed to avoid preemption by imposing such 
a prohibition indirectly.”153 While the national bank could theoret-
ically still make loans at a rate higher than that permitted by the 
Connecticut statute, the court concluded that “as a practical mat-
ter” the law either disallowed the national bank to use agents to 
make these loans or forced the bank to “forgo their NBA-
permitted rates and limit themselves to the lower rates specified 
by” the Connecticut statute.154 Again, the court’s focus seemed to 
be on the economic impact on the national bank—effectively, un-
der the statute, the bank could not offer these loans at the rates 
it otherwise would have charged, much as the bank in SPGGC 
could not issue gift cards under the state statute prohibiting ex-
piration dates. 
2. Madden held that no agency relationship results from 
loan sales and that preemption does not apply to the 
purchaser. 
The Second Circuit has established that NBA preemption 
may apply when a national bank employs an agent to carry out 
its powers and when applying state law to the agent would effec-
tively prohibit the national bank from exercising its powers. In 
Madden, the Second Circuit was asked to determine whether 
NBA preemption of state usury laws continued after the sale of a 
loan to a non–national bank third party. The Second Circuit, dis-
tinguishing this case from SPGGC and Pacific Capital Bank, held 
 
 149 See id at 344–45 (“A refund anticipation loan . . . is a loan that is made to a tax-
payer at or about the time of filing his or her income tax return and that is expected to be 
repaid to the lender directly from the proceeds of the borrower’s anticipated tax refund.”). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id at 345. 
 152 See Pacific Capital Bank, 542 F3d at 352–53. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id at 353–54. 
10 SMITH_CMT_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016 2:24 PM 
1654  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1631 
   
that declining to allow NBA preemption to transfer upon sale of a 
loan did not interfere with the exercise of a national bank’s power 
to sell loans.155 
In holding that the NBA did not preempt the claim of usury, 
the Second Circuit looked to its holding in SPGGC. It compared 
the sale of loans to a third party to the monthly fee in SPGGC.156 
Just as regulating the fees that an agent of the national bank 
could charge in SPGGC would not have prevented the national 
bank from issuing the gift cards, regulating a third party’s inter-
est rate would not prevent the bank from selling the loans to the 
third party.157 While the court admitted the possibility “that usury 
laws might decrease the amount a national bank could charge for 
its consumer debt in certain states,” the court believed that “such 
an effect would not ‘significantly interfere’ with the exercise of a 
national bank power.”158 Further, the court distinguished this 
case from Pacific Capital Bank on the basis that third-party debt 
buyers are not the bank’s agents.159 While the bank could employ 
an agent to collect the debt—at which point the Second Circuit 
suggested preemption would continue—once the national bank 
sold the loan, there would be no agency relationship, and as a re-
sult the NBA would not have preemptive effect.160 
Additionally, and contrary to Posner’s economic analysis of 
the issue, the Second Circuit worried not about the cost of credit 
but rather about the overextension of preemption by allowing na-
tional banks to run around state usury laws.161 The Second Cir-
cuit’s asserted policy goal led it to focus more on form than on 
substance; it distinguished Madden from the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion in Krispin based on the fact that in Krispin the national 
bank retained some ownership in the loan despite the fact that 
the non–national bank entity had the full economic risk of the 
loan.162 Effectively, the court seemed to suggest that had the na-
tional bank retained any interest in the loans (through, for exam-
ple, maintaining a modest ownership interest, servicing the ac-
counts, or setting ongoing terms for the extension of credit), 
 
 155 See Madden, 786 F3d at 249–53. 
 156 See id at 251. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See Madden, 786 F3d at 250–51, citing John C. Lyons Jr, OCC Bulletin 2014-37 
(OCC, Aug 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3BUL-2AA6. 
 160 See Madden, 786 F3d at 250–51. 
 161 See id at 251–52. 
 162 Id at 252–53. 
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preemption would have been maintained.163 But if the Second Cir-
cuit were really interested in adopting a policy of avoiding over-
extensions of preemption, this modest difference in substance 
(some or minimal ownership compared to no ownership) does not 
perfectly capture the court’s preference—the court may be allow-
ing preemption in effectively identical situations, such as when a 
national bank sells substantially all of the loan, due to its focus 
on form over substance. 
By holding that preemption is not applicable when a national 
bank sells its loan, the Second Circuit created a fundamental dif-
ference between its policy and the policies adopted in the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits—those circuits created a bright-line 
rule that once a loan is nonusurious, the loan is always nonusur-
ious. To the contrary, the Second Circuit holds that so long as a 
national bank maintains some modicum of ownership (broadly de-
fined) in the loan, preemption is applicable, but once ownership is 
fully extinguished, the NBA ceases to apply. As a result, a petition 
for a writ of certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court,164 but 
certiorari was denied.165 
C. Reckoning with the Different Interpretations 
The split in authority between the Second Circuit and the 
Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits is implied by the language of 
the opinions in the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. The Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have not directly confronted the is-
sue of whether a complete sale of a loan by a national bank to a 
third party removes the NBA’s preemptive effect on state usury 
laws. However, the sweeping language of those courts suggests 
that they would likely hold this to be the case, as they have 
adopted the proposition that a nonusurious loan does not lose its 
nonusurious quality upon transfer. 
The Second Circuit attempted to distinguish these cases 
based on the full sale of the debt occurring in Madden (in which 
the Second Circuit found that the national bank maintained no 
ownership postsale) and some remaining ownership in the loans 
at issue in Krispin. Moreover, the Second Circuit characterized 
the bank in Madden as different from the bank in Krispin because 
 
 163 See id (noting that the bank did not retain an interest in the account, contrary to 
Krispin). 
 164 See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Midland Funding, LLC v Madden, 
Docket No 15-610 (US filed Nov 10, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 7008804). 
 165 Midland Funding v Madden, 2016 WL 3461580, *1 (US). 
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the bank at issue in Krispin “issue[d] credit, processe[d] and ser-
vice[d] customer accounts, and set[ ] such terms as interest and 
late fees,” which gave the bank an interest in the loan absent pri-
mary ownership.166 
The cases are not as readily distinguishable as the Second 
Circuit made them seem. The Second Circuit claimed that, upon 
the sale of the debt, the national bank no longer has an interest 
in the loan. That is contrary to the typical transaction in which a 
seller sells an account to a third party: the seller of the account 
may still have a relationship with the buyer but not an interest 
in the loan once it is sold. For example, when someone purchases 
a car, the dealership or car manufacturer no longer has an inter-
est in the car after the sale but may still have a relationship with 
the purchaser. Yet the Second Circuit failed to account for the 
Krispin national bank’s continuing relationship with May De-
partment Stores in distinguishing Krispin from Madden. Because 
the national bank was a subsidiary of May Department Stores, 
the preemption framework outlined by the Court in Watters could 
be applicable—May Department Stores was merely carrying out 
the power of a national bank by acting as the bank’s agent. This 
distinction would help align the Second and Eighth Circuit deci-
sions with Supreme Court precedent. Still, similar to Madden, the 
national bank subsidiary of May Department Stores was “re-
quired to maintain arms’-length transactions” with its parent.167 
While there was an ongoing relationship between May Depart-
ment Stores and the national bank in Krispin, the arm’s length 
nature of the relationship makes it similar to Madden. However, 
there is no explanation as to why an ongoing relationship should 
be a basis for preemption but a subsidiary relationship should 
not. As such, the cases may not be as distinguishable as the 
agency theory may imply. 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s rejection of the analogy to 
Lattimore is misplaced, similar to its rejection of the analogy to 
Krispin. Lattimore is Madden in reverse, and holds that the orig-
inator, not the buyer, determines the interest rate. While the facts 
are in reverse, the principle adopted in Lattimore can be applied 
to Madden to achieve a fundamentally different result. It is not 
clear why the principle in Lattimore should not be adopted in 
 
 166 Madden, 786 F3d at 252, quoting Krispin, 218 F3d at 924. 
 167 Krispin, 218 F3d at 923. 
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Madden. As such, the Second Circuit, by not adopting this princi-
ple, created a break from the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. 
III.  PREEMPTION APPLIES TO THIRD-PARTY SALES 
The difference of opinion between the circuits raises an im-
portant question for both consumers and the financial industry.168 
The Second Circuit’s analysis of conflict preemption was cursory 
and did not explore the full implications of not allowing the NBA 
to continue to be preemptive in the event of a sale to third parties. 
This Part first provides a fulsome preemption analysis and then 
analogizes to the common law and constitutional law to support 
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ conclusions that the NBA should 
continue to be preemptive even after the sale of a loan to a third 
party. Finally, a transaction cost framework is presented to show 
that, contrary to the Second Circuit’s and academics’ assertions, 
the Madden holding may impact only the form and not the sub-
stance of debt sales to third parties. Effectively, national banks 
will employ methods to circumvent an inability to sell with 
preemptive effect. Those methods and the transaction costs asso-
ciated with those methods will likely be passed on to consumers. 
Therefore, allowing preemption to continue upon sale may be not 
only the simplest solution but also the best one for consumers. 
A. Standard Conflict Preemption Analysis Is Not Dispositive 
While the Second Circuit in Madden determined that 
preemption did not continue because of the lack of an agency re-
lationship, its preemption analysis focused on the sale of a de-
faulted loan, and, as a result, the opinion did not investigate the 
implications of the holding on other national bank powers. This 
Section conducts a more robust preemption analysis regarding all 
of the potential powers implicated by disallowing preemption 
posttransfer. This Section starts by confirming that preemption 
analysis is applicable in this scenario, and it then proceeds to de-
termine the national bank powers that are implicated by loan 
sales. This Section concludes by showing the potential divergence 
of opinion regarding whether restricting preemption to only na-
tional banks severely impairs any of the identified powers. 
 
 168 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, Madden v Midland Funding, LLC, Case No 14-
2131, *39–42 (2d Cir filed Aug 15, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 4180161) (as-
serting that the continuation of preemption after transfer would circumvent recent con-
gressional actions to protect consumers). 
10 SMITH_CMT_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016 2:24 PM 
1658  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1631 
   
1. Preemption analysis is applicable. 
Before determining which way preemption analysis cuts, the 
preliminary question whether preemption analysis applies to 
loan sales by a national bank to a third party must be answered. 
The usury laws at issue are being enforced against a third party, 
not against a national bank. Most circuits agree that the NBA 
still preempts state laws even if the law is enforced against only 
a non–national bank, because it may impact a national bank. The 
Supreme Court has never clearly ruled on this issue, but Watters 
is persuasive here, as it sets out national bank powers as the focal 
point of a preemption analysis.169 Some commentators have sug-
gested that, under then-current case law, while the NBA would 
apply to regulation of a national bank’s counterparties, such reg-
ulation would not have preemptive force.170 However, such analy-
sis has not generally taken the holdings of Krispin or Lattimore 
into account in the context of state usury laws.171 Further, even 
the Second Circuit agrees that, in some instances, the NBA can 
preempt state laws enforced against non–national banks.172 Reg-
ulation of national banks’ counterparties, especially regulation 
aimed at changing the national banks’ behavior, likely implicates 
the NBA.173 Accordingly, a conflict preemption analysis is in order. 
2. Third-party sales implicate powers of national banks. 
Prior to determining whether the NBA preempts state usury 
laws, it is necessary to identify the powers of national banks that 
could conflict with state usury laws. The power to charge an in-
terest rate that is permissible in the state where the bank is lo-
cated may be implicated by the application of state usury laws to 
 
 169 See Watters, 550 US at 18–19 (affirming a focus on powers by asserting that “[s]ecu-
rity against significant interference by state regulators” should adhere to all powers of a 
national bank regardless of where within the corporate structure the business is conducted). 
 170 See, for example, Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Mar-
kets Upstream, 26 Yale J Reg 143, 208–10 (2009). 
 171 See id. 
 172 See SPGGC, 505 F3d at 190 (finding it possible that “a national bank’s decision to 
carry out its business through an unaffiliated third party such as SPGGC might constitute 
an exercise of the bank’s incidental powers under the NBA”). 
 173 See, for example, Pacific Capital Bank, 542 F3d at 353: 
If a state statute subjects non-bank entities to punishment for acting as agents 
for national banks with respect to a particular NBA-authorized activity and 
thereby significantly interferes with national banks’ ability to carry on that ac-
tivity, the state statute does not escape preemption on the theory that, on its 
face, it regulates only non-bank entities. 
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third parties, but other powers of a national bank are also impli-
cated.174 A national bank has the power to “make, sell, purchase, 
participate in, or otherwise deal in loans and interests in loans 
that are not secured by liens,”175 as well as the power to sell and 
securitize loans176 and to sell loans associated with real estate 
lending.177 Effectively, Congress has given national banks the 
ability to lend money at the interest rate allowed in the state 
where they are located, freely trade loans, and, if necessary, sell 
loans for the purpose of securitization. All of these powers are po-
tentially implicated if preemption does not follow loans made by 
national banks. 
3. The effect on national banks’ powers is significant. 
When state laws potentially impact a national bank’s power, 
a preemption analysis is warranted. In Dodd-Frank, Congress 
clarified that a court’s inquiry in an NBA-preemption case is gov-
erned by the “prevents or significantly interferes” standard from 
Barnett Bank.178 This question, whether a state law “significantly 
interferes” with a national bank’s power, is intensely fact-specific, 
and courts’ decisions in these cases generally rest on their char-
acterizations of the power and the interference. The Second Cir-
cuit’s characterization of the impairment in Madden is emblem-
atic. In Madden, the court saw the harm as changing the price at 
which banks could sell their debt, not an inability to sell debt.179 
The impairment in Madden can be analogized to the types of im-
pairments found in other cases. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the NBA preempts state laws prohibiting banks from 
charging nondepositors ATM fees.180 The question that the Second 
 
 174 It may be necessary to clarify at this time that the mere fact that a national bank 
is granted the power to do something does not mean that other types of entities will not 
have the same or similar powers. For example, national banks are allowed to issue loans, 
but so are state banks. Regardless, the focus of preemption analysis is the powers granted 
to national banks by Congress, not those powers relative to the powers of other entities. 
 175 12 CFR § 7.4008(a). 
 176 12 CFR § 1.3(g) (“A national bank may securitize and sell assets that it holds, as 
a part of its banking business.”). 
 177 12 USC § 371(a). 
 178 See notes 60 and 77–80 and accompanying text. 
 179 See Madden, 786 F3d at 251 (asserting that applying “state usury laws would not 
prevent consumer debt sales by national banks to third parties,” but admitting that “it is 
possible that usury laws might decrease the amount a national bank could charge for its 
consumer debt in certain states”). 
 180 See Bank of America v City and County of San Francisco, 309 F3d 551, 561–66 
(9th Cir 2002) (holding that the power to charge fees was in conflict with state laws pre-
venting national banks from charging ATM fees). 
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Circuit addressed in Madden is similar to the question in the 
Ninth Circuit case—whether a state’s usury laws prevent a bank 
from charging an interest rate that it is permitted to charge under 
the NBA. 
Similarly, courts have recently held that the NBA has 
preemptive effect with regard to check-cashing laws. These laws 
provide that a bank must cash a check at par value.181 Courts have 
held that state laws prescribing that banks cash checks at par are 
in conflict with regulations promulgated by the OCC under the 
NBA.182 These state laws do not stop a national bank from charg-
ing fees but rather prohibit a specific type of fee. Similarly, in the 
case of loan transfers, holding that preemptive effect does not 
carry over may not stop a national bank from selling the debt; it 
will just restrict or impair the bank’s ability to do so. While in the 
check-cashing cases the OCC’s interpretation of “customers” was 
at issue,183 the courts nonetheless held that the OCC’s interpreta-
tion was warranted and that state laws “prohibit[ed] the exercise 
of a power which federal law expressly grants the national 
banks.”184 Madden is a similar case, albeit without an interpreta-
tion by the OCC: The NBA permits a national bank to sell loans.185 
Allowing the loan transfers to decrease the permissible interest 
rate impairs the bank’s ability to sell those loans, though it does 
not eliminate the ability—just as regulating the amount for which 
a bank can cash a check does not prevent the bank from imposing 
other fees on its customers. However, in the check-cashing cases, 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits saw such an activity as impeding 
the powers of a national bank and, as such, determined that the 
NBA was preemptive. Similar logic should apply upon the trans-
fer of a loan. 
The Supreme Court has not drawn a clear line as to what 
constitutes “significant impairment” of a national bank’s power. 
As shown above, the characterization of the facts is important, 
 
 181 See Baptista v JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 640 F3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir 2011); 
Wells Fargo Bank of Texas NA v James, 321 F3d 488, 489 (5th Cir 2003). See also Tex Bus 
& Comm Code Ann § 4.112. 
 182 See, for example, Baptista, 640 F3d at 1196–98, citing 12 CFR § 7.4002(a) (provid-
ing a national bank with the authority to “charge its customers non-interest charges and 
fees, including deposit account service charges”). 
 183 See Wells Fargo Bank of Texas, 321 F3d at 492–95 (holding that the effect of the 
regulation was preemptive only to the extent that “Congress meant to delegate to the OCC 
the discretionary authority embodied in [12 CFR § 7.4002(a)]”). 
 184 Id at 495. See also Baptista, 640 F3d at 1198. 
 185 See 12 CFR § 7.4008(a). 
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and judges may import their policy preferences into the charac-
terization of the facts to obtain their desired outcomes. In close 
cases, any potential to definitively answer the preemption ques-
tion by characterizing the facts in a certain way seems dissatisfy-
ing and can likely be improved upon by looking for alternative 
paths of analysis. In that vein, Marquette provides another ave-
nue for preemption analysis. 
The petitioners in Marquette claimed that a national bank 
should be considered located wherever the creditor does busi-
ness.186 The Court rejected this because it would “throw into con-
fusion the complex system of modern interstate banking” and cre-
ate a great deal of uncertainty for national banks when they 
originated loans.187 Similarly in the context of third-party loan 
sales, banks would need to take into account the debtor’s location 
when selling the loan and, potentially, when originating the loan. 
Perhaps more worrisome is that the bank would need to track the 
debtor (in this case a defaulted debtor), as it is unclear which 
state’s usury law would apply: the state where the debtor opened 
the account, the state where the debt was sold, or the state where 
the debtor brought his usury claim. While the debt buyer may be 
more concerned about this ambiguity, the bank would also need 
to be concerned in order to provide the potential debt buyer with 
this information. Such an administratively complex system pred-
icated on the application of state law may run afoul of the pro-
scription in Marquette. 
Lastly, national banks, in addition to having the power to sell 
loans, have the power to securitize assets. In general, securitiza-
tions occur when a bank pools assets together (in this case, loans) 
and sells them to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV is able 
to purchase these assets from the bank by issuing debt to inves-
tors. Securitizations generally occur shortly after the origination 
of loans, at which point the bank sells the loans at par (that is, at 
100 cents on the dollar).188 If preemption were not carried forward, 
then the bank either could not securitize certain assets (assets 
that would be usurious once owned by a non–national bank en-
tity) or would have to stop underwriting loans at an NBA-
permissible rate if it wanted to securitize those loans. Either way, 
the national bank’s ability to securitize loans would be hampered. 
 
 186 See Marquette, 439 US at 310. 
 187 Id at 312. 
 188 Frank J. Fabozzi and Vinod Kothari, Securitization: The Tool of Financial Transfor-
mation *3 (Yale ICF Working Paper No 07-07), archived at http://perma.cc/SH7Q-MTUG. 
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In fact, the effect would be similar to what the Second Circuit ob-
served in Pacific Capital Bank. In that case, because usury laws 
were enforced on the bank’s agent, the bank was forced to either 
not make loans or make loans at a rate below the rate allowed 
under the NBA.189 
Similarly, in the securitization context, if preemption does 
not continue after the sale of the asset to a third party, the bank 
will have to either get out of the business of securitization or 
(more likely) lend to some consumers at rates below the rate al-
lowed under the NBA. The same choice presented in Pacific Cap-
ital Bank exists in this situation, but the choice is starker. Con-
ceivably, in Pacific Capital Bank, the bank could have set up a 
tax return business that, in addition to filing tax returns, offered 
refund-anticipation loans. Here, on the contrary, if the Second 
Circuit’s holding stands, a national bank would not be able to per-
form one of its powers—securitization—without taking the state 
usury laws into account. 
4. Through the NBA, the federal government is imposing a 
price cap on national banks that should not change upon 
sale. 
Usury laws can be conceptualized as price caps—the permis-
sible interest rate is the price ceiling for a national bank. This 
price cap inevitably affects the price at which banks can purchase 
(underwrite) and sell loans. In this sense, allowing individual 
state usury laws to apply to national banks has the same effect as 
allowing individual state check-cashing laws to apply—it restricts 
national banks’ ability to exercise their power. While state usury 
laws may be viewed as background contract principles that are 
generally exempt from preemption absent explicit federal law in-
tervention,190 they are in fact another form of consumer protection 
laws.191 Allowing state usury laws to control the sale or transfer 
 
 189 See text accompanying note 154. 
 190 See 12 CFR § 7.4008(e) (declaring that state contract law is not generally 
preempted). 
 191 The distinction between contract law and consumer protection law is a legal ques-
tion. However, the notion that usury laws should be regarded as a type of consumer pro-
tection law is supported by the fact that they are usually enacted by state legislatures, 
rather than derived from the common law, see Hill, Note, 6 NC Bank Inst at 421–22, 426 
(cited in note 82), as well as the fact that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not 
discuss usury laws. 
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of debt would “impose state requirements that differ[ ] from” fed-
eral law.192 
The case for federal preemption of usury laws is, in many re-
spects, no different from the case for federal preemption of state 
tort claims in medical-device cases.193 In the medical-device space, 
the federal government has set a minimum safety standard and 
has preempted state laws to the extent they impose a higher 
standard on the device manufacturer, as allowing states to im-
pose higher standards would “disrupt[ ] the federal scheme.”194 
This makes sense—if every state imposed some higher safety 
standard, medical-device manufacturers would be forced to either 
produce fifty different products or, more likely, conform to the 
highest safety standard. States would be able to regulate in an 
area in which the federal government has made clear that there 
should be only national regulation. 
Similarly, the NBA was enacted to create a federal banking 
scheme insulated from state interference.195 Just as the federal 
government set national safety standards for medical devices, the 
NBA sets standards for national banks, including a price cap on 
the products they offer. In the medical-device field, allowing state 
law to increase safety standards may lead to state law supersed-
ing federal law in application. In medical devices, the worry is 
that states will raise the safety floor. In the national bank context, 
the worry is that states will lower the usury ceiling. National law 
must, then, preempt state law. Otherwise, the fear of state law 
creeping into and dominating an area in which the federal gov-
ernment has established a national rule is likewise apparent. 
But the Court has acknowledged that there are occasions 
when state regulation of medical devices is not preempted. Ac-
cording to the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent, when the duty owed by manufacturers under state law 
parallels the duty owed under the federal law, the federal law 
 
 192 Riegel v Medtronic, Inc, 552 US 312, 321 (2008), quoting Riegel v Medtronic, Inc, 
451 F3d 104, 121 (2d Cir 2006). 
 193 It should be noted that in medical-device cases, the national law at issue does not 
look to state law for its national effect. However, the purposes of both laws are similar, 
and, as such, the analogy is apt. To be sure, there are differences between the regulation 
of medical-device manufacturers and national banks. For example, the NBA creates a dual 
banking system while federal law universally governs medical-device manufacturing. Nev-
ertheless, the analogy is fitting—the fundamental purpose of each set of regulations is to 
relieve an industry from the burdens of individual state laws and to allow the federal gov-
ernment to determine a national policy. 
 194 See Riegel, 552 US at 323–26. 
 195 See Part I.A. 
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does not preempt state law.196 In providing some clarity on what 
types of laws parallel state laws, the Court’s decisions, as inter-
preted by the Tenth Circuit, have specified that state and federal 
laws parallel one another “not only when they are identical, but 
also when state law imposes duties on the defendant that are ‘nar-
rower, not broader’ than those” imposed by federal law.197 For ex-
ample, if federal law imposed a strict liability regime on a medical-
device manufacturer but state tort law imposed a negligence 
standard, all else equal, the laws would parallel each other be-
cause the state law was “narrower” than the federal law.198 
Admittedly, this analysis applies imperfectly to the NBA con-
text. Medical devices are traditionally national products produced 
for a national consumer base.199 And while the growth in national 
banks means that large multistate banks dominate the lending 
market today, historically bank loans have been more local in 
scope.200 Nonetheless, the analogy helps clarify how the Court em-
ploys preemption analysis to a law meant to create a uniform sys-
tem of regulation. And, while not discussed in any court, a medical-
device manufacturer does not lose the preemptive force of federal 
law because it sells the product into the market. Medical devices 
are regulated for the purpose of being put into the market and 
used by medical practitioners—eliminating preemption upon the 
transfer of the device would negate the purpose of the enterprise. 
Applying the analogy to national banks, the loans underwritten 
by the banks are similarly conceived of as products to be put into 
the market. 
Loans may not typically be thought of as products, but from 
the banks’ perspective, loans are a product they are selling. Banks 
compete on price just as manufacturers do; the price just happens 
 
 196 See Caplinger v Medtronic, Inc, 784 F3d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir 2015), citing Medtronic, 
Inc v Lohr, 518 US 470, 495 (1996). 
 197 Caplinger, 784 F3d at 1338, quoting Medtronic, 518 US at 495. 
 198 Caplinger, 784 F3d at 1338. 
 199 See, for example, ResMed Inc, Form 10-K Annual Report pursuant to Section 13 
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
2015 *13 (SEC, Aug 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6PCH-TG5A (noting that, as a 
medical-device manufacturer, the company “attempt[s] to tailor [its] marketing ap-
proach to each national market”) (emphasis added). 
 200 See Mitchell A. Petersen and Raghuram G. Rajan, Does Distance Still Matter? The 
Information Revolution in Small Business Lending, 57 J Fin 2533, 2533–34 (2002) (ob-
serving that historically “the decision to offer credit has to be made very close to where the 
information is gathered,” but that from 1973 to 1993 “the physical distance between small 
firms and their lenders [grew] steadily”). 
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to be the interest they charge. There is nothing conceptually dif-
ferent about what manufacturers and banks are doing—the for-
mer sell products and the latter sell money, but they both sell 
something. In a medical-device case, an injured patient could not 
sue the doctor due to the medical device’s malfunction if the de-
vice adhered to the federal regulation. Similarly, the preemption 
of usury in the NBA should not fall because of the sale of the 
bank’s product—a loan. Applying the same logic that the Su-
preme Court applied to medical devices supports a finding of 
preemptive effect. 
5. Preemption analysis, and the “significantly impairs” test 
specifically, does not yield a conclusive answer. 
Despite the above analysis, how best to interpret preemption 
of state usury laws remains unclear. Some commentators have 
suggested that state regulators can regulate bank counterparties 
to prevent a bank from exercising some powers, such as the power 
to sell loans to third parties.201 However, these commentators ad-
mit that regulating a national bank’s counterparty (in this case 
by enforcing state usury laws) “might constrict the secondary 
market for consumer debt and thereby lower the resale price of 
the debt.”202 At first blush, this does not appear to be regulating 
the national bank but instead modestly changing the market for 
the bank’s credit. Yet this change may have broader implications: 
reducing the price at which banks can sell loans into the second-
ary market may incentivize banks to change the terms of their 
initial loans. Therefore, by regulating counterparties, states are 
implicitly regulating national banks203—an outcome the NBA was 
enacted to avoid. 
In terms of formal preemption analysis, the question is at 
what point state laws “significantly impair” the bank’s ability to 
sell loans and to set the terms for loans. In Madden, the court 
found that allowing state usury laws to apply to third-party debt 
purchasers would “limit[ ] only activities of the third party which 
are otherwise subject to state control.”204 On the surface, the ar-
gument that a decrease in the interest that can be charged from 
 
 201 See, for example, Levitin, 26 Yale J Reg at 208–10 (cited in note 170). 
 202 Id at 209. 
 203 See id at 208–10 (arguing that regulation of banks’ counterparties may impact the 
terms at which banks originate loans). 
 204 Madden, 786 F3d at 251, quoting SPGGC, 505 F3d at 191 (brackets in original). 
As discussed in Part III.C, this assumption is likely faulty—the finding of preemption will 
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27 percent to 25 percent likely does not “significantly impair” a 
bank’s ability to either originate or sell loans is persuasive. But 
there are two problems with this line of reasoning. First, following 
this reasoning to its logical extreme would allow state usury laws 
to creep from just impairing a bank’s ability to originate and sell 
loans to “significantly impairing” a bank’s ability to originate and 
sell loans—line drawing in this case would have to turn on the 
specific facts of the state’s laws, the national bank’s location, and 
the amount of business a bank does in the state. Moving forward 
in this fashion would be cumbersome, but a focus solely on the 
preemption analysis leads to this conclusion. If the Second Cir-
cuit’s logic is pushed to this extreme, fact finding regarding what 
significantly harms a national bank would best be left to either 
Congress or the OCC. 
Second, this line of reasoning belies the realities of bank reg-
ulation. The Second Circuit has admitted that applying state 
usury laws to third-party sales “might decrease the amount a na-
tional bank could charge for its consumer debt in certain 
states.”205 Stopping there, the court found that this decrease in 
price would not “significantly interfere” with a national bank’s 
powers.206 The reality of bank regulation offers a more complex 
view. 
Several US regulators, including the OCC, the Federal Re-
serve, and the FDIC, regulate national banks. This regulation is 
done via minimum-capital requirements.207 Effectively, regula-
tors force banks to risk weight their assets and to hold capital 
against their assets on a risk-weighted basis. Risk weights en-
courage certain types of lending over others.208 Regulators have 
chosen risk weighting as a way to confront the inevitable moral 
hazard problem in banking—government insurance, in the form 
of deposit insurance and bailouts, allows banks to take excess risk 
 
increase transaction costs but likely will not change the price at which banks can sell the 
loans. Rather, these increased costs (the costs of transacting around preemption not flow-
ing to third-party debt purchasers) will be pushed onto consumers through a variety of 
mechanisms—for example, through higher interest rates, higher default rates, and in-
creased fees. Nevertheless, this Section assumes that the Second Circuit’s logic—the logic 
applying usury fees to third-party sales—holds true, but it finds that the Second Circuit 
stopped too soon in its analysis. 
 205 Madden, 786 F3d at 251. 
 206 Id. 
 207 See Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy Re-
quirements?, 82 U Chi L Rev 1853, 1866–72 (2015) (describing the modern bank-regulatory 
scheme).  
 208 See id at 1881–82. 
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because the bank captures the upside but is insured on the down-
side by the government.209 The risk weights are expected to proxy 
the riskiness of the loans. So, for example, a US Treasury bill will 
have a risk weight lower than a loan to a highly indebted corpor-
ate borrower.210 The risk weight is then multiplied by the face 
value of the loan. To continue the example, if a bank held $100 of 
US Treasury bills and $100 in risky corporate loans with risk 
weights of 20 percent and 150 percent, respectively, the bank 
would have risk-weighted assets of $170 on $200 of assets at face 
value. 
Once a bank determines the amount of risk-weighted assets 
it holds, it must then ensure that it has enough capital relative to 
its risk-weighted assets. Here, regulators provide a rule, such as 
a 7 percent capital ratio. The capital–asset ratio represents the 
amount of equity a bank must hold relative to its risk-weighted 
assets. In the above example, if the required capital–asset ratio 
were 7 percent, the bank would need to hold $11.90 of capital. 
This capital represents the amount of downside risk a bank can 
withstand—the value of the bank’s risk-weighted assets can de-
cline by 7 percent before the bank will be insolvent. The price 
other banks will pay for defaulted loans (like those at issue in 
Madden) with high capital requirements, and thus high equity 
requirements, is limited by the capital requirements—a lower 
price will increase the expected return and may make the pur-
chase attractive despite the large capital requirements. 
After the global financial crisis of 2008, US regulators im-
posed updated risk-weight requirements on banks.211 Presently, a 
ninety-day defaulted, unsecured loan has a risk weight of 150 per-
cent.212 This means that for every $1 of defaulted debt, a bank 
must hold $1.50 of equity.213 Effectively, the expected return on 
 
 209 See id at 1860. 
 210 See id at 1869. 
 211 See Posner, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1871 (cited in note 207). 
 212 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of 
Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standard-
ized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, 
Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed 
Reg 62018, 62090 (2013), amending 12 CFR § 3.32(k) (establishing a rule that “a banking 
organization must apply a 150 percent risk weight to all past-due [unsecured] exposures”). 
 213 This assumes that the capital ratio is 100 percent. While this is an unrealistic 
assumption, it enhances the ease of the foregoing analysis. Using a more realistic capital 
ratio would not significantly change the outcome of the analysis. 
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defaulted debt will be significantly reduced because of the in-
creased capital requirement. Assume that the initial risk weight 
on the asset was 100 percent, so that for each $1 of loan, the bank 
held $1 of equity. If the expected return on the loan were 10 per-
cent, the bank would expect a 10 percent return on its equity, be-
cause the loan was fully funded with equity.214 If the creditor de-
faults, the risk weight would jump to 150 percent (such that the 
bank would then need to fund the loan with $1.50 of equity for 
every $1 of loan). That will reduce the bank’s return to 6.67 per-
cent, assuming the expected return of the loan remains constant.215 
This has implications for the price of the loan that a bank in 
the Second Circuit (under Madden) is attempting to sell. Other 
banks216 will not be able to purchase the debt at its intrinsic value 
because of this regulation, so debt purchasers may be the only 
natural buyers left. At this point, nonbank debt purchasers have 
a solid advantage over banks in the market for these loans: they 
can already drive the price down, and allowing usury laws to ap-
ply to their purchases will only decrease the price they are willing 
to pay. 
This discussion ends where it started—the extent to which 
applying usury laws to debt sold by a national bank will impair 
the bank’s ability to exercise its powers is an empirical question. 
Under the Second Circuit’s analysis, a court’s ability to answer 
such a question will either require extensive expert analysis or 
deferral to administrative agencies or Congress. As a result, turn-
ing to other analogies and analyses of this issue may create a 
more robust and administrable solution for courts. Of course, the 
Court has not typically used this line of analysis, instead resting 
on a more formalized idea of whether the application of state law 
conflicts.217 However, turning to other analogies in the next Sec-
tions—including to the common law, to constitutional law, and to 
 
 214 Allowing risk weights of less than 100 percent allows the bank to put leverage on 
its assets, which will increase the simple expected return. However, for the purpose of ease 
and clarity, this example assumes a 100 percent risk weight. 
 215 The bank originally put up $1 of equity for every $1 of loan, at an expected return 
of 10 percent. So, for every $1 of equity, the bank expected 10 percent in return. When the 
risk weight increases, the bank will then have $1.50 of equity for every $1 of loan, still 
with an expected return of 10 percent. Ten percent of $1 is only 6.67 percent of $1.50, so 
the bank’s new expected return will decrease. 
 216 Capital requirements apply to all banks, not just national banks. Therefore, the 
reduction in the market for defaulted debt may be significant since this analysis will apply 
to all banks. 
 217 See, for example, Barnett Bank, 517 US at 42–43. 
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a transaction cost framework—may help provide further support 
to this analysis. 
B. Common-Law Precedent and Constitutional Principles in 
the Contract Clause Generally Support Preemptive Effect 
Prior to the passage of the NBA, the Supreme Court issued 
various rulings indicating that a loan, once nonusurious, could 
not become usurious upon a subsequent transaction. Congress 
legislated against this backdrop. While none of these cases has 
facts similar to Madden, some suggest in dicta that the Court has 
always presumed that a loan’s usurious quality could be assessed 
only at the time of origination. Common-law precedent is bol-
stered by indications that the Court views the NBA as a national 
law governing contracts. As such, allowing state usury laws to 
impair a contract may run afoul of the Contract Clause of the Con-
stitution.218 This Section first explores the common-law precedent 
and applies it to the question of preemption. Then, this Section 
examines questions related to the fact that the NBA could be in-
terpreted as a federal law governing a contract, specifically dis-
cussing choice-of-law rules and the Contract Clause. 
1. Contract law confirms that a transaction, once 
nonusurious, cannot be made usurious by subsequent 
transactions. 
The early nineteenth-century Court addressed the issue of 
usury in broad language. These cases generally involved allega-
tions of usury as a result of a discount on a note from the original 
holder to a third party.219 Essentially, the claim was that while 
the original interest rate was nonusurious, the note became usu-
rious because the third party’s rate of return would be higher than 
allowed by state law once the discount was taken into account. In 
multiple cases, the Supreme Court rejected this notion and noted 
in dicta that “the rule cannot be doubted, that if the note be free 
 
 218 US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1. 
 219 See generally, for example, Gaither v Farmers and Mechanics Bank of Georgetown, 
26 US (1 Pet) 37 (1828); Moncure v Dermott, 38 US (13 Pet) 345 (1839). A discount is the 
amount by which the face value of the note exceeds the price that is paid by the buyer of 
the note. For example, a note with a face value of $100 that is sold for $90 has a discount 
of $10. 
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from usury, in its origin, no subsequent usurious transactions re-
specting it, can affect it with the taint of usury”220 and that “a con-
tract, which, in its inception, is unaffected by usury, can never be 
invalidated by any subsequent usurious transaction.”221 Perhaps 
most explicitly, the Court stated that “[i]f the bond was free from 
usury in its inception, no subsequent transaction between other 
parties could invalidate it.”222 And in the canonical case of Ogden 
v Saunders,223 the Court propounded that usury laws “declare [a] 
contract to be void in the beginning,” not after the contract has 
been established.224 
Despite the Court’s strong language, these holdings are per-
suasive but not absolute authority on the matter of usury—these 
cases are set in a historical context in which notes traded freely 
between parties and were used as a form of currency.225 Prohibit-
ing appropriate discounting of the notes in the nineteenth century 
would have reduced the amount of currency within the system 
and could have caused a run on coin money. However, modern 
contract law provides further support that, once a nonusurious 
loan is made, its nonusurious character is maintained in perpetu-
ity. Historically, “[a]t common law, an assignee of a chose in ac-
tion could enforce its right at law only in the name of the as-
signor.”226 While having to sue in the name of the assignor has 
become a historical relic, it provides some insight into the current 
dispute. Modern contract law allows a party to freely assign the 
right of the other party’s performance to someone else.227 In fact, 
the Uniform Commercial Code specifically allows a party to alien-
ate his portion of the contract unless “the assignment would ma-
terially change the duty of the other party, or increase materially 
the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair ma-
terially his chance of obtaining return performance.”228 Not only 
can the contract be assigned but the damages resulting from a 
 
 220 Gaither, 26 US (1 Pet) at 43. 
 221 Nichols v Fearson, 32 US (7 Pet) 103, 109 (1833). 
 222 Moncure, 38 US (13 Pet) at 356. 
 223 25 US (12 Wheat) 213 (1827). 
 224 Id at 348. 
 225 See Laurence Ales, et al, A Model of Banknote Discounts *2 (Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis Working Paper No 641, Mar 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/M7R6-H5A8. 
 226 Samuel Williston and Richard A. Lord, 29 A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 
§ 74:55 at 582 (West 4th ed 2003) (citation omitted). 
 227 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317 (1979). 
 228 UCC § 2-210(2). 
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breach of contract can also be assigned.229 Allowing parties to 
freely alienate their contractual rights allows those rights to flow 
to their highest-valued use.230 Contract law has always presumed 
that “the assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor, assuming 
his rights as well as his duties.”231 
While hearkening back to mid- and late nineteenth-century 
cases risks the claim of irrelevance, the Court has relied on and 
cited older cases in ruling on NBA preemption.232 The Court may 
be looking to these older cases because preemption focuses on con-
gressional intent, and, given the limited legislative history avail-
able from 1864, these cases provide some of the best evidence of 
such intent. The decision in Marquette exemplifies the point: find-
ing a lack of directly relevant legislative history, the Court turned 
to historical Supreme Court cases to support its inferences about 
what Congress knew about banking and how it intended the NBA 
to apply.233 Additionally, allowing claims to transfer with the 
same rights that the original contracting party had is a feature of 
both historical and modern contract law. While Congress adopted 
state usury laws, it did so against the backdrop of existing con-
tract law, which adopted the once nonusurious, always nonusuri-
ous principle. As a measure of congressional intent and back-
ground rules governing contractual relationships, the once 
nonusurious, always nonusurious principle has ample support. 
Reading the NBA with this backdrop supports the transfer of the 
rights the contract has when initiated and allows preemption to 
continue postsale. 
 
 229 UCC § 2-210(2) (“A right to damages for breach of the whole contract or a right 
arising out of the assignor’s due performance of his entire obligation can be assigned de-
spite agreement otherwise.”). 
 230 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15 (1960) (declaring 
famously that “[i]t is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial 
legal delimitation of rights”). 
 231 Olvera v Blitt & Gaines, PC, 431 F3d 285, 288 (7th Cir 2005). 
 232 See, for example, Marquette, 439 US at 308, citing Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Na-
tional Bank v Dearing, 91 US 29, 34 (1875); Barnett Bank, 517 US at 32 (citing historical 
cases for the purpose of establishing that the history of the NBA “is one of interpreting 
grants of both enumerated and incidental ‘powers’ to national banks as grants of authority 
not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law”); Smiley v 
Citibank (South Dakota), NA, 517 US 735, 745–46 (1996), citing Craig v Pleiss, 26 Pa 271, 
272–73 (1856) (finding support from mid-nineteenth-century cases for a definition of “in-
terest rates,” under the NBA, that includes late fees); Watters, 550 US at 11–12, citing 
Farmers’ and Mechanics’ National Bank, 91 US at 34 (finding support for the notion that 
exercise of state control over national banks is a usurpation of the national banks’ power). 
 233 See Marquette, 439 US at 318. 
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2. The NBA is a federal law that governs the contract from 
inception until completion. 
Historical and modern contract law seem to suggest that 
usury is a question best decided at the inception of a contract. 
These issues involve questions of state law. While a generaliza-
tion of the common law supports the adoption of the once nonus-
urious, always nonusurious policy, state courts may attempt to 
invoke the public policy of their states to find the usury laws of 
other states inapplicable.234 
The potential for courts to invoke public policy to enforce 
their states’ usury laws may suggest that common-law analogies 
do not fully support allowing preemption to continue. This as-
sumes that state law fully governs the loan contract, and the Su-
preme Court has suggested—though never fully confirmed—that 
the NBA and the usury law associated with it are national law, 
not state law. As such, the invocation of state law to hold the 
transferred loan usurious may conflict with choice-of-law princi-
ples and the Contract Clause. 
There are many reasons why Congress may seek to incorpor-
ate state law into federal law, but regardless of the reason, “state 
law is generally borrowed with the understanding that it should 
serve federal interests.”235 The law governing the interest rate in 
a contract originating between a national bank and a debtor is 
federal law, and by means of 12 USC § 85, federal law imposes a 
choice-of-law rule on the contract’s interest rate: the law of the 
state where the bank is located governs. As national law governs 
the contract at inception, and the interest rate provision in par-
ticular, that law should continue to govern even upon the sale. As 
discussed above,236 basic contract law asserts that the rights of an 
assignor flow to the assignee and, as a result, the federal choice-
of-law rule with respect to interest rate should continue to apply 
posttransfer. 
If federal law governs the contract at inception, then there 
are two potential theories that explain why federal law should 
continue to control upon a sale to a third party. The first is a 
 
 234 For an example of a court invoking its state’s public policy to invalidate a contract, 
see In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A2d 1227, 1246–50 (NJ 1988) (holding a surrogacy con-
tract invalid because it conflicted with the public policy of the state). 
 235 Radha A. Pathak, Incorporated State Law, 61 Case W Res L Rev 823, 846 (2011). 
Examples of federal laws that incorporate state laws include the Federal Tort Claims Act 
and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Id at 839. 
 236 See notes 227–31 and accompanying text. 
10 SMITH_CMT_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016 2:24 PM 
2016] Banking on Preemption 1673 
 
choice-of-law theory—the parties at the time of contract for-
mation stipulated that federal law, for the purposes of the defense 
of usury, would apply. The Supreme Court has settled the issue 
of choice-of-law provisions relating to usury: 
The general principle in relation to contracts made in one 
place to be performed in another is well settled. They are to 
be governed by the law of the place of performance, and if the 
interest allowed by the law of the place of performance is 
higher than that permitted at the place of the contract, the 
parties may stipulate for the higher interest without incur-
ring the penalties of usury.237 
In non-NBA cases, courts continue to enforce choice-of-law 
provisions allowing parties to stipulate which state’s usury laws 
will apply. When parties claim a usury defense that is not appli-
cable under the chosen law, courts have rejected their claims.238 
By adopting state law within the NBA, Congress applied a choice-
of-law rule with respect to usury defenses—the choice-of-law rule 
should not change because of the transfer of the contract. And, as 
the Court has noted, the NBA provides the “exclusive cause of ac-
tion for such claims” of usury against national banks.239 Thus, 
Congress’s rule is the exclusive rule for the disposition of these 
cases. 
A second theory relates to both the Supremacy Clause and 
the Contract Clause of the US Constitution. The Contract Clause 
prevents a state from enacting a law that “impair[s] the [o]bliga-
tion of [c]ontracts.”240 Initial support for the Contract Clause ap-
plying to third-party sales comes from Ogden, in which the Court 
suggested that usury laws apply only at the inception of the con-
tract.241 The Court noted that usury laws determine whether a 
contract is void or valid when it is formed. Because usury laws 
apply only at inception, they cannot impair the obligations of duly 
established contracts, and do not violate the Contract Clause. 
 
 237 Miller v Tiffany, 68 US (1 Wall) 298, 310 (1863). The Court in Miller noted that it 
would not have permitted such a stipulation if it were made in bad faith. So long as “the 
form of the transaction is not adopted to disguise its real character,” the Court would up-
hold a stipulation of usury laws. Id. 
 238 See, for example, Uniwest Mortgage Co v Dadecor Condominiums, Inc, 877 F2d 
431, 434–38 (5th Cir 1989) (holding that the law of the state chosen by the parties governed 
the contract at issue and that, since the parties had chosen Colorado law, the defense of 
usury was unavailable). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971). 
 239 Beneficial National Bank v Anderson, 539 US 1, 11 (2003). 
 240 US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1. 
 241 See Ogden, 25 US (12 Wheat) at 348. 
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However, application of these laws after the contract’s inception 
would violate the Contract Clause.242 
For the Contract Clause to be applicable, a state law has to 
“operate[ ] as a substantial impairment of a contractual relation-
ship.”243 To find such an impairment, the court must find that (1) a 
contractual relationship existed; (2) “a change in law impairs that 
contractual relationship”; and (3) said impairment is “substan-
tial.”244 For purposes of the NBA, the change-in-law prong will be 
paramount to finding a violation of the Contract Clause. The idea 
that federal law pervades the interest rate provision of a contract 
may seem abstract, but the Supreme Court has suggested that it 
understands the NBA to operate in such a fashion.245 The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly described the NBA as federal law 
that governs the contracts into which national banks enter.246 As 
a result, federal law at the time of origination has declared the 
contract valid and nonusurious. To find that the law changed 
upon sale to a third party suggests that there is in fact a change 
in law. This potential change in law is likely void, as the Supreme 
Court has determined that “if a law should declare that contracts 
already entered into, and reserving the legal interest, should be 
usurious and void, either in the whole or in part, it would impair 
 
 242 See id at 326–27, 348. 
 243 General Motors Corp v Romein, 503 US 181, 186 (1992), quoting Allied Structural 
Steel Co v Spannaus, 438 US 234, 244 (1978). 
 244 General Motors, 503 US at 186. 
 245 See Marquette, 439 US at 308 (asserting that the interest rate a national bank can 
charge is “governed by federal law”); Evans v National Bank of Savannah, 251 US 108, 
114 (1919) (holding that federal law “completely defines what constitutes the taking of 
usury by a national bank, referring to the state law only to determine the maximum per-
mitted rate”). 
 246 See Barnett Bank, 517 US at 32, quoting Easton v Iowa, 188 US 220, 229–30 (1903) 
(“[The] national banking system [is] normally ‘independent, so far as powers conferred are 
concerned, of state legislation.’”); Anderson National Bank v Luckett, 321 US 233, 248 
(1944) (“This Court has often pointed out that national banks are subject to state laws, 
unless those laws infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on the 
performance of the banks’ functions.”); Griffith v Connecticut, 218 US 563, 569–70 (1910), 
quoting State v Hurlburt, 82 Conn 232, 233–34 (1909) (“The exception from its operation 
of loans by national banks was merely a recognition of the legal effect, in excluding state 
legislation on the same subject, of the statutes of the United States which regulate their 
right to make such contracts.”); Waite v Dowley, 94 US 257, 533 (1876) (“[W]here there exists 
a concurrent right of legislation in the States and in Congress, and the latter has exercised 
its power, there remains in the States no authority to legislate on the same matter.”). 
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the obligation of the contract, and would be clearly unconstitu-
tional.”247 Further, while the Contract Clause has fallen out of fa-
vor with courts,248 the Supreme Court has noted that although the 
state has the power to impair remedies, its police power is weaker 
when it destroys a contract.249 Finding support for the second 
prong of the Contract Clause analysis nullifies the potential for 
states to apply their usury laws to transferred contracts. 
Though this analysis suggests the Contract Clause is impli-
cated, courts may choose to avoid the constitutional question.250 
Nevertheless, the potential implication of the Clause continues to 
support an interpretation that the NBA should continue to 
preempt after a transfer of an originally nonusurious loan. 
Simplified, the above analysis provides two insights into 
whether preemption should continue after a sale to a third party. 
First, the Court has adopted a view on choice-of-law rules in the 
specific context of usury that should be followed: parties may con-
tract at the time of origination for a law that applies regarding 
usury. In the context of an agreement with a national bank, the 
applicable law is governing federal law—the parties agree to 12 
USC § 85 as a choice-of-law provision that applies the laws of the 
national bank’s location to any defense of usury. This choice of law 
should not change upon a transfer. Second, if federal law declares 
a contract nonusurious upon origination, any subsequent state law 
impairment of the contract may run afoul of the Contract Clause.251 
 
 247 Sturges v Crowninshield, 17 US (4 Wheat) 122, 207 (1819). See also Home Building 
& Loan Association v Blaisdell, 290 US 398, 431–34 (1934) (“The obligations of a contract 
are impaired by a law which renders them invalid, or releases or extinguishes them.”). 
 248 See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Constitutional Constraints on Retroactive Civil Legisla-
tion: The Hollow Promises of the Federal Constitution and Unrealized Potential of State 
Constitutions, 14 Nev L J 63, 71–73 (2013), quoting Julian Velasco, Shareholder Owner-
ship and Primacy, 2010 U Ill L Rev 897, 941 (“[A]s interpreted, the Contract Clause does 
not have much bite.”). 
 249 Blaisdell, 290 US at 439: 
Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the 
fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserved power 
cannot be construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be 
construed to destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. They must be 
construed in harmony with each other. This principle precludes a construction 
which would permit the State to adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or 
the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them. 
 250 See International Association of Machinists v Street, 367 US 740, 749–50 (1961) 
(supporting the notion that when one interpretation has the potential to raise serious con-
stitutional questions, the Court may choose another potential interpretation). 
 251 See Ogden, 25 US (12 Wheat) at 326–27 (confirming the principle of Sturges that 
if usury laws “should be made to operate upon contracts already entered into, they would 
be unconstitutional and void”). See also General Motors, 503 US at 189 (citing Sturges for 
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Both of these analyses divert from the conflict-preemption 
analysis that the Court has traditionally conducted in NBA cases. 
Nevertheless, they provide further evidence that congressional 
intent likely supports preemption—these background principles 
all support preemption carrying forward absent a contrary indi-
cation from Congress. 
C. A Transaction Cost Framework Shows That Madden Will 
Not Impact the Secondary Market for Loans and Will Harm 
Future Consumers 
As shown above, preemption analysis does not provide a de-
finitive answer to the question about loan transfers—the question 
whether a state law “significantly impairs” a national bank’s pow-
ers turns on factual characterization. While an interpretation of 
the NBA as federal law and the application of basic tenets of com-
mon law and of the Contract Clause suggest that the interest rate 
originally charged should continue posttransfer, no court that has 
addressed this issue has adopted that stance. This Section shows 
that the resolution of this issue does not affect the functioning of 
the market because “[i]t is always possible to modify by transac-
tions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights.”252 And, 
because the states where national banks are located have essen-
tially nonexistent usury laws,253 modifying contracts will not be 
prevented by the existing laws governing national banks. Adopt-
ing this view shows that creating barriers to transfer will harm 
consumers, not banks. To show how the view adopted in Madden 
can harm consumers, this Section first lays out a theoretical model 
for how banks navigate around the rule adopted in Madden by re-
taining a small portion of a loan upon sale. Next, this Section shows 
how banks will react if courts find such an approach unlawful. 
1. Allowing state usury laws to apply after the sale of a 
loan will increase the cost of loans to consumers but will 
not stop national banks from selling these loans. 
This Section explains the basic intuition that preventing the 
federal interest rate from following the loan will have the most-
 
the proposition that “[a] change in the remedies available under a contract, for example, 
may convert an agreement enforceable at law into a mere promise, thereby impairing the 
contract’s obligatory force”). 
 252 Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 15 (cited in note 230). 
 253 See text accompanying note 51. 
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adverse consequences for consumers. For example, if preemption 
does not follow the full sale of a loan to a third party, a national 
bank could sell a 99 percent participation interest in the loan, al-
low the debt collector (as the bank’s agent) to collect on the debt, 
and then engage in a swap transaction with the debt collector to 
swap the return on the last 1 percent of the debt still owned by 
the national bank.254 The national bank would still have an inter-
est, albeit extremely minor, in the loan, but the national bank 
would bear no risk on that interest because of the swap, similar to 
Krispin.255 As this example shows, preventing preemption from fol-
lowing the debt will increase the cost of transferring the debt, but 
it is unlikely to have an impact on how banks conduct business.256 
There are three scenarios in which the issue of preemption 
carrying forward emerges: (1) the national bank originates a loan 
with the intent to sell to a known buyer (a rent-a-charter scheme), 
(2) the national bank originates a loan with the intent to sell to 
an unknown buyer (securitization), and (3) the national bank 
originates a loan with the intent to hold the loan but will sell to 
an unknown buyer in the event of a default on the loan (a loan-to-
hold scheme). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 254 This would likely be permissible even under the Second Circuit’s holding in Madden. 
The court suggested that so long as a national bank maintained an interest in the debt, 
preemption should continue to apply. See Madden, 786 F3d at 252–53, citing Krispin, 218 
F3d at 924 (distinguishing the legality of applying preemption in Krispin from the illegal-
ity of applying preemption in the instant case because in Krispin, the national bank “re-
tained an interest” in the debt). 
 255 Krispin, 218 F3d at 921–23. See also Part II.B. 
 256 Note that, throughout this Section, it is assumed that the consumer does not enter 
bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy is a legitimate means by which consumers can re-
duce their debt burdens. See, for example, Till v SCS Credit Corp, 541 US 465, 470 (2004) 
(describing how filing for bankruptcy reduced the petitioners’ debt burden). However, 
bankruptcy can be costly to consumers—it may reduce the amount of credit they are able 
to obtain in the future and come with a social stigma. See generally Kartik Athreya, Shame 
as It Ever Was: Stigma and Personal Bankruptcy, 90 Econ Q 1 (Spring 2004). Regardless, 
the ability to enter bankruptcy always lingers in the background but is beyond the scope 
of this Comment. 
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TABLE 1.  NATIONAL BANK LOAN OPTIONS 
Rent-a-Charter Securitization Loan-to-Hold 
National bank 
originates a loan with 
the intent to sell to a 
known third party. 
This scheme is 
common when payday 
lenders use national 
banks to avoid state 
usury laws. 
National bank originates 
a portfolio of loans with 
the intent to sell into a 
securitization vehicle. 
The true buyer of the debt 
is unknown at the time of 
origination, and the bank 
holds the risk if a 
securitization cannot be 
accomplished in the 
market. 
National bank 
originates a loan for its 
balance sheet. The 
bank intends to service 
the loan and will likely 
continue to do so 
unless the debtor 
defaults, at which 
point the bank may 
sell the loan for risk or 
efficiency reasons. 
In all three scenarios, a national bank would still be able to 
achieve the economic effects of a full sale, while maintaining 
preemption. As discussed above, this would involve partial sales 
and swaps contracts on top of those partial sales. In addition to 
the increased transaction costs of fully alienating the loan in a 
world in which preemption does not carry forward, the national 
bank may still be subject to potential liability under various laws, 
for example, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,257 if it must 
remain a lender of record to have preemption carry forward. 
If national banks continue to be subject to potential liability 
when alienating their loans, they may increase the cost of their 
loans to account for this potential future cost. National banks, 
knowing ex ante that selling the full loan will be costly (in terms 
of increased transaction costs and potential liability), will account 
for these additional costs by charging consumers more for credit—
the bank can create an identical economic situation regardless of 
the rule imposed by passing on its additional costs to consumers 
in the form of more-expensive credit. This will both make it more 
costly for most consumers to access credit and prevent the mar-
ginal consumer from obtaining credit. The marginal consumer 
seeking credit will tend to be the same person usury laws are 
 
 257 Pub L No 95-109, 91 Stat 874 (1977), codified at 15 USC §§ 1692–1692p. 
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meant to protect—a poorer individual with a weak or limited 
credit history.258 
Even if these changes did not restrict consumers’ access to 
credit, they would raise the cost of credit for consumers by increas-
ing fees or interest rates.259 High interest rates may cause debtors 
to fall into a cycle of debt that is difficult to escape.260 Usury laws 
are one way that state governments work to prevent consumers 
from becoming trapped by this cycle of debt. Paradoxically, the ap-
plication of state usury laws to transferred loans would harm con-
sumers rather than protect them, which is the purpose of usury 
laws generally.261 This insight has been confirmed empirically in 
other industries. For example, after a court ruled that a state could 
not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state sellers of wine, 
the price of wine at in-state stores declined dramatically.262 Effec-
tively, laws set up to isolate in-state consumers, and protect in-
state businesses, from the force of the national market had the ef-
fect of increasing costs to consumers.263 Similarly, analysis of 
preempted state banking laws shows that, upon preemption, con-
sumers’ access to banking services increases.264 
Additionally, preventing preemption from carrying forward 
does not serve the policy goals of state usury laws. National banks 
can still import lenient state usury laws into any state; they just 
would have to sell their loans more creatively. The policy of the 
NBA, in many ways, weakens the force and effect of state usury 
laws—reviving them via preventing preemption from carrying 
forward will not change the ability of banks to lend at rates higher 
 
 258 See Part I.D. 
 259 In the states where most national banks are located, namely, Delaware and South 
Dakota, there are effectively no usury limits, so the reality is that not allowing preemption 
to carry forward will not restrict a bank’s ability to charge a consumer a higher interest 
rate up front to account for the potential of having to sell the defaulted loan at a lower 
price. See 5 Del Code Ann § 943 (allowing a bank to charge any “rate or rates as the agree-
ment governing the [extension of credit] provides or as established in the manner provided 
in the agreement governing the [extension of credit]”); SD Cod Laws § 54-3-1.1 (establish-
ing that “there is no maximum interest rate or charge, or usury rate restriction between or 
among persons, corporations, limited liability companies, estates, fiduciaries, associations, 
or any other entities if they establish the interest rate or charge by written agreement”). 
 260 See Scott Horsley, Payday Loans — and Endless Cycles of Debt — Targeted by 
Federal Watchdog (NPR, Mar 26, 2015), online at http://www.npr.org/2015/03/26/ 
395421117/payday-loans-and-endless-cycles-of-debt-targeted-by-federal-watchdog (vis-
ited Feb 27, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 261 See Part I.D. 
 262 Mason, Kulick, and Singer, 12 U Pa J Bus L at 800–01 (cited in note 105). 
 263 See id. 
 264 See id at 794–97 (showing that after state restrictions on ATM fees were found to 
be preempted by the NBA access to ATMs increased). 
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than the state usury laws allow and will likely not protect con-
sumers from these loans. 
After Madden, this is no longer a theoretical discussion. 
Lending Club, a company that connects borrowers with nonbank 
lenders, has changed its practices in line with what the transac-
tion cost framework suggests. Historically, loans originated by 
Lending Club were issued by banks, held for two days by the 
banks, and ultimately sold either to Lending Club or other non-
bank lenders.265 Under the once nonusurious, always nonusurious 
framework, Lending Club’s process is not problematic. In re-
sponse to Madden, in February 2016, Lending Club revised its 
policy. Now, “the issuing bank maintains an on-going economic 
interest in all loans made after they are sold.”266 The increased 
transaction costs this relationship adds to the process will ultim-
ately be charged to the consumer—either in the form of higher 
interest rates or reduced credit. Lending Club’s change concre-
tizes the results suggested by the transaction cost analysis of the 
question of preemption continuing to apply after a sale—banks 
will find ways around it and consumers will be harmed. 
2. Even if courts apply state usury laws to national bank–
originated loans posttransfer, banks can mitigate their 
effects through contractual negotiation. 
If the process of selling loans proposed above were struck 
down by courts,267 banks could change their contracts with con-
sumers such that they would be allowed to charge a large default 
fee. Such a fee is unquestionably allowed under current preemp-
tion doctrine. The Supreme Court in Smiley v Citibank (South 
Dakota), NA268 upheld an OCC regulation that defined “interest” 
for the purposes of the 12 USC § 85 as including “any payment 
compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an extension 
 
 265 See LendingClub Corp, Form 10-K: Annual Report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2015 *9 
(SEC, Feb 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/C3TV-PARF. 
 266 Lending Club Enhances Relationship with Issuing Bank (PR Newswire, Feb 26, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5PHA-E5CP. 
 267 The courts in both Madden and Krispin did not define what an “interest” in a loan 
was for the purpose of preemption, though both concluded that if a national bank does 
have an interest in the loan, the NBA continues to preempt state law usury claims. If a 
court under the scenario presented in Part III.C.1 took a realist view—that is, that the 
bank does not have an interest in the loan economically although it is still technically the 
lender of record—then the court could strike down the practice of having banks retain 
small economic interests to allow preemption to continue postsale. 
 268 517 US 735 (1996). 
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of credit, making available of a line of credit, or any default or 
breach by a borrower of a condition upon which credit was ex-
tended.”269 Under this interpretation, fees that count as interest 
include late fees, annual fees, overdraft fees, and default fees.270 
Additionally, these modifications could be made to existing con-
tracts, as “lenders retain the right to change the contract at will” 
in most consumer credit contracts.271 
Once a consumer defaults, the bank can charge this default 
fee (and add it to the customer’s balance) before selling to a third 
party. Because a national bank, and not a third party, assesses 
the fee, NBA preemption applies to the portion of interest and fees 
that is charged before transferring the loan. That is, national 
banks could sell the loan for the same price as they do now by 
simply charging the future interest payments to the consumer up 
front in the form of a default fee and then selling the loan to a 
third party. This would harm a consumer who missed a payment 
for innocuous reasons, because the probability of the consumer 
being a true default borrower would already have been charged 
to his account. 
3. The administrative uncertainty of allowing state usury 
laws to apply after a transfer is costly. 
Lastly, returning to the Supreme Court’s logic in Marquette,272 
the uncertainty that could be created by not allowing the preemp-
tive effect of the NBA to transfer may have deleterious effects on 
both consumers and banks. While it would be clear that NBA 
preemption would not continue, what would remain unclear is 
which state’s usury laws would apply to the loan after the sale—
the state of the consumer, the state of the debt collector, or the 
state chosen in the original lending agreement? Per the discus-
sion above, the common-law rules of contract suggest that the in-
terest rate should transfer, but if they are not preempted, then 
each state’s choice-of-law rules would govern these issues indep-
endently. The costs of this uncertainty would likely also be fac-
tored into new loans going forward, increasing the costs for most 
 
 269 Id at 740, 747, quoting 61 Fed Reg 4689. This regulation is now codified at 12 CFR 
§ 7.4001(a). See also Smiley, 517 US at 745–47 (holding that the OCC’s regulation defining 
interest expansively was a reasonable interpretation of the NBA). 
 270 12 CFR § 7.4001(a). 
 271 Bar-Gill and Warren, 157 U Pa L Rev at 13 (cited in note 98). 
 272 See Part I.C.1. 
10 SMITH_CMT_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016 2:24 PM 
1682  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1631 
   
consumers and leading to a reduction in credit available for the 
marginal consumer. 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike most federal laws, courts afford the NBA a presump-
tion of preemption because of the unique history of the Act and 
because of Congress’s fear that states would attempt to protect 
their banks at the expense of national banks. The Supreme Court 
continues to show deference to national banks when deciding 
whether state law applies to them. The current controversy—
whether NBA preemption of state usury laws continues after sale 
of a loan to a third party—represents the latest battleground over 
NBA preemption. As shown above, applying state usury laws to 
third parties will likely impact the way a national bank does busi-
ness, but preemption analysis is intensively fact driven. The com-
plications of the analysis discussed above suggest that courts will 
not be well positioned to make these determinations. Because all 
courts agree that some harm will be generated, preemption is the 
best solution—precise line drawing here is too difficult, so con-
vincing proof that this will significantly interfere with a national 
bank’s business should be enough to warrant preemption carrying 
forward. Because of the factual basis of the preemption question, 
relying on analogies to other areas of law seems persuasive. 
However, reliance on the principles of contract law, theories 
associated with federal incorporation of state laws, and an inter-
pretation of the Contract Clause suggest that a loan, once non-
usurious, does not become usurious as a result of a sale. Addition-
ally, while first-order thinking may seem to suggest that holding 
state usury laws valid after the sale of a loan to a national bank 
will help consumers, analysis in a transaction cost framework re-
veals that just the opposite is true. 
Usury laws have uniformly been enacted to protect consum-
ers, though it remains an open question whether they truly pro-
tect consumers or instead harm them by reducing the availability 
of credit in the marketplace. Regardless, in this context, a finding 
that preemption does not continue upon sale of a loan would harm 
all consumers by increasing the cost of credit and likely cutting 
some marginal debtors out of the market. Creating a more com-
plicated loan market that harms consumers is the wrong result, 
and when confronted with this issue courts should take second-
order effects into account. 
